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HE academic literature on same-sex unions continues but at a
somewhat reduced rate,1 and a new wave of academic writing has
moved toward a bolder inquiry: whether marriage is a proper sub-
*B.A., University of Texas; M.A., BCL, Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia Uni-
versity. The author thanks Clinton C. Brown for his assistance in preparing this Article.
1. See, e.g., Jonathan Brophy, Comment, Death Is Certain, Are Taxes? Another Argu-
ment for Equality for Same-Sex Couples under the Code, 34 Sw. U. L. REV. 635 (2005);
Kurt G. Kastorf, Comment, Logrolling Gets Logrolled: Same-Sex Marriage, Direct Democ-
racy, and the Single Subject Rule, 54 EMORY L.J. 1633 (2005); Symposium, Same-Sex
Couples: Defining Marriage in the Twenty-First Century, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 1
(2005); Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758 (2005); Nadine A.
Gartner, Restructuring the Marital Bedroom: The Role of the Privacy Doctrine in Advocat-
ing the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2004); Scott T.
Fitzgibbon, The Formless City of Plato's Republic: How the Legal and Social Promotion of
Divorce & Same-Sex Marriage Contravenes the Principles and Undermines the Projects of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (2005), availa-
ble at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss5/art5. To put all this in historical perspective, see STE-
PHANIE CooNrz, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY OR How LOVE
CONQUERED MARRIAGE (Viking 2005); Ezra Hasson, Wedded to 'Fault': the Legal Regula-
tion of Divorce and Relationship Breakdown, 26 LEGAL STUD. 267 (2006). The United
Kingdom adopted the concept of no-fault-based divorce in 1857, somewhat relaxed that
attitude in 1971, and in 1973 the no-fault notice came to occupy the field. When the princi-
ple of "civil partnership" came into effect in 2005, the fault-based cause for dissolution
came with it. See Rachel Duffy Lorenz, Comment, Transgender Immigration: Legal Same
Sex Marriages and Their Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act, 53 UCLA L. REV.
523 (2005). See also Tobin A. Sparling, Symposium, Judicial Bias Claims of Homosexual
Persons in the Wake of Lawrence v. Texas, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 255 (Nov. 2, 2004); Adrienne
Butcher, Comment, Selective Constitutional Analysis in Lawrence v. Texas: An Exercise in
Judicial Restraint or a Willingness to Reconsider Equal Protection Classification of Homo-
sexuals?, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1407 (2004); Leslie J. Harris, Same-Sex Unions Around the
World, 19 PROB. & PROP. 31 (Sept.-Oct. 2005); Linda Silberman, Same-Sex Marriage: Re-
fining the Conflict of Laws Analysis, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2195 (2005); Shannon Pare, Legali-
zation of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States and Canada: The Unequal Application of
Equal Protection, 11 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 363 (2005); Erin Stefanec, Comment, Mimick-
ing Marriage: As the Evolution of the Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage Progresses,
Civil Unions Currently Represent the Best Alternative to Marriage, 30 U. DAYTON L. REV.
119 (2004); Gloria Bluestone, Note, Going to the Chapel and We're Going to Get Married:
But Will the State Recognize the Marriage? The Constitutionality of State Marriage Laws
after Lawrence v. Texas, 10 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 189 (2005); William N. Eskridge, Body
Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV.




ject of state-definition and control.2 It seems unlikely that the new topic
is any more likely to find expression in statutes and judicial decisions than
the earlier line of argument. In the 2005 general election, the people of
Texas expressed a very negative attitude toward these matters in adopting
a constitutional amendment stating that "(a) Marriage in this state shall
consist only of the union of one man and one woman; (b) This state or a
political subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any legal
status identical or similar to marriage."'3
B. INFORMAL MARRIAGE
The dispute with respect to an alleged informal marriage in Lewis v.
Anderson4 was largely a factual one, as is usually the case in informal-
marriage cases. The couple had been ceremonially married in 1974, but
about two and a half years later, the doctor-husband "determined that
divorce was absolutely necessary because he would not allow his financial
situation to be jeopardized by [his nurse-wife's] emotional state."' 5 One
of the husband's principal complaints was his wife's reluctance to sign
documents concerning financial matters. A divorce followed. Except for
a few days in 1978 when the husband locked the wife out of the house,
they lived together until 1998, when the woman brought suit for divorce.
The alleged husband denied that there was any marriage to dissolve.6
The petitioner showed that, after a few weeks of separation following
the divorce, the couple lived together, represented to others that they
were husband and wife, and both used the husband's name. They joined
a church together as a married couple and were so regarded there. They
adopted two children as a married couple. Evidence of their being mar-
ried was far more copious than is often encountered in such cases. How-
ever, the only date to which the woman could testify as the date of the
marriage was the date of the ceremonial marriage in 1974. She testified
that they had never discussed the fact that they were informally married.
A California bankruptcy court held in In re Rabin, 336 B.R. 459, 461 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
2005), that "registered domestic partners" in bankruptcy, like married persons under Cali-
fornia law, may claim a homestead in the property that they own and share. The court
pointed out, however, that such persons are treated as individuals for California income-
tax purposes in filing returns and computation of earned income. They are entitled to-
gether to only one homestead exemption. Id.
2. The Cardozo Law Review has devoted most of an issue to the subject: Daniel A.
Crane, A Judeo-Christian Argument for Privatizing Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1221
(2006); Nancy J. Krauer, A Marriage Skeptic Responds to the Pro-Marriage Proposals to
Abolish Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1261 (2006); Charles J. Reid, Jr., And the
State Makes Three: Should the State Retain a Role in Recognizing Marriage? 27 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1277 (2006); Carol Sanger, A Case for Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1311
(2006); Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing
Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161 (2006).
3. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
4. Lewis v. Anderson, 173 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied). For an
instance of informal marriage in relation to federal income-tax liability, see Rinehart v.
Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1172 (2003).
5. Lewis, 173 S.W.3d at 558.
6. Id. at 557-58.
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The man also testified that there was no other date of marriage than that
of their ceremonial marriage. They had celebrated that wedding anniver-
sary every year. The woman seemed to have forgotten about the divorce,
and the man told her from time to time that they were married. There
was not only some evidence of an implied agreement to be married, but
also evidence of an express agreement to be married after the divorce.
The man testified that in 1994 he had made arrangements to remarry the
petitioner, but she had declined. He also testified that he had contacted
the Internal Revenue Service in 1997 to say that the joint income tax
return that they had filed was a mistake. Relying on Russell v. Russell7
and distinguishing the facts of the case before them from those in Gary v.
Gary,8 the Dallas Court of Appeals sustained the finding of the trial court
and jury that there was a subsisting informal marriage. The appellate
court relied heavily on the jury's verdict and rejected the man's assertion
that the trial court's instructions to the jury were improper.9
Despite periodic anxiety of some within and outside the legislative pro-
cess that Texas' minimum age of ceremonial marriage is either too high or
too low, the minimum age has tended upward from 1837, when it stood at
fourteen for males and twelve for females, to 1966, when those minimum
ages were moved up to sixteen and fourteen respectively, to 1969, when
the age was set uniformly for both at sixteen for licensed marriages, with
the requirement of parental or judicial consent for those aged fourteen to
sixteen.10 In the early 1970s, one of the draftsmen of what would become
the Family Code observed that a minimum age of fifteen would best suit
the mores of the rural folk in his neighborhood. After long discussion,
however, the drafting committee concluded that the age of sixteen was
then more appropriate to modem needs, however inconvenient it might
be for those who their colleague identified as the "cedar-choppers" of his
region. The minimum age of sixteen was fixed in 1975 but moved up to
eighteen (not requiring either parental or judicial consent) in 1997.11
Similar minimum ages have also been prescribed for recordation of infor-
mal marriages since 1969.12 As the minimum age was seventeen, a plea
of non-age was rarely heard.13
In 2005 the minimum age for parental consent to a ceremonial mar-
riage of a minor was moved upward from fourteen to sixteen,14 though
judicial consent might be given for a younger petitioner if in the peti-
7. 865 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. 1993).
8. 490 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
9. Lewis, 173 S.W.3d at 559-62.
10. See Joseph W. McKnight, Commentary to the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 13 TEX.
TECH. L. REv. 611, 634-37 (1982).
11. Id. at 635-39.
12. See, e.g., id. at 648-51.
13. See Rosanne Piatt, Overcorrecting the Purported Problem of Taking Child Brides
in Polygamfous] Marriages: The Texas Legislature Unconstitutionally Voids All Marriages
by Texans Younger than Sixteen and Criminalizes Parental Consent, 37 ST. MARY'S L.J. 753
(2006).
14. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.102 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
2006] 1309
SMU LAW REVIEW
tioner's best interest.1 5 The minimum age for registration of an informal
marriage was set at eighteen in 1997.16
In Creel v. Martinez,17 the validity of an informal marriage between a
young woman and a man several years older was in issue. The jury found
that an informal marriage occurred on July 24, 1997, when the woman
was seventeen. At that time, the statute18 provided that such a marriage
was valid though voidable, if lacking parental consent, until the woman
reached the age of eighteen or died in the meantime. 19 On September 1,
1997, section 2.401(f), which changed the minimum age to eighteen for
informal marriages, became effective. The effect of the new law on prior
law was in issue.
In Creel, the surviving husband of his alleged marriage had brought suit
on behalf of his infant child against the defendant-physician for the
wrongful death of the plaintiff's alleged late wife. The defendant argued
that the 1997 statute invalidated the marriage because of non-age of the
woman. Because the marriage in issue remained voidable until the wo-
man became eighteen in early 1998, the Houston First District Court of
Appeals held that the plaintiff lacked any vested right to sue until the
woman reached the age of eighteen or died before the effective date of
section 2.401 on September 1, 1997.20 The court relied on Beck v. Beck,21
in which the Supreme Court of Texas held that the 1980 amendment to
article XVI, section 15 of the Texas Constitution had an intended retro-
spective effect as indicated by the legislative history of the proposed
amendment. The wife in Beck, therefore, held a voidable interest under
a prenuptial agreement affecting her separate property interest, and thus,
her husband's asserted community property rights had never "vested. '22
In reliance on Beck, the Houston court stated, "Just as the wife's voidable
interest in the prenuptial agreement [in Beck] prevented the husband's
community property rights from ever vesting, we conclude that [the] ...
voidable [informal] marriage failed to create any vested protection from a
change in the law regarding informal marriages to minors. ' 23
Despite the court's comments on vested rights, the significant conclu-
sion of the supreme court in Beck was that the constitutional amendment
of 1980 "demonstrates an intention on the part of the legislature and the
people of Texas not only to authorize future premarital agreements but
also to impliedly validate section 5.41 [now sections 4.001-4.003] of the
Texas Family Code [as enacted in 1969 and 1989 and reenacted as
amended earlier in the legislative session of 199724] and all marital agree-
15. Id. § 2.103.
16. Id. § 2.201(c).
17. 176 S.W.3d 516 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet denied).
18. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN § 6.102 (Vernon 1998).
19. Id. § 2.401(a), (c) (effective Sept. 1, 1977).
20. Creel, 176 S.W.3d at 520.
21. 814 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. 1991).
22. Creel, 176 S.W.3d at 520-21.
23. Id.
24. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.404(b)(2), (c)(1), (2) (2004).
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ments entered into before 1980 pursuant to that statute. '2 5 Thus, by the
retrospective constitutional amendment, a prior unconstitutional statue
and agreement made under it were made effective despite the fact that
certain vested rights had been acquired under the prior law. The effect of
a retrospectively constitutional amendment is vastly different, however,
from a statutory one that does not even purport to be retrospective in its
effect,26 except with respect to suits brought before and after the stat-
ute's effective date. In Creel an informal but voidable marriage uncon-
tested by the man and woman was incapable of being voided if a party to
it died before the effective date of the statutory amendment changing the
minimum age for entering into an informal marriage from sixteen to
eighteen.
In Phillips v. Dow Chemical Co., the husband of a deceased tort victim
failed to show that the couple was informally married. The husband's
claim was barred by the fact that when the informal marriage was alleged
to have existed, he was still married to someone else, and that marriage
continued until after the death of the plaintiff's alleged second wife.27
Though the man may have mistakenly believed that his first marriage had
been terminated before his alleged second marriage, his assertion of a
putative marriage in the second instance was untenable because the man
had acknowledged the validity of the prior union in the subsequent di-
vorce suit to dissolve it.2 8 Though the man may have been a putative
spouse in his own mind during his alleged informal marriage, his status as
a putative spouse could not be effectively pled because the statute re-
ferred to a "spouse," which he was not.2 9 The husband's assertion of col-
lateral estoppel was also of no assistance to him because his contestants
were not parties to the probate proceeding at which he was declared the
decedent's surviving spouse.30
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
A. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL PARTITIONS
In Sheshunoff v. Sheshunoff3' the Austin court pointedly rejected the
25. See Beck, 814 S.W.3d at 749.
26. The enactment discussed here is 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1362, § 1, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws
7.
27. 186 S.W.3d 121 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.).
28. Id. at 127-28.
29. See Ft. Worth & Rio Grande Ry. v. Robertson, 131 S.W. 400 (Tex. 1910), approv-
ing and adopting the opinion of the dissenting judge in the court below. 121 S.W. 202, 204
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth, 1909, no writ). See also Tex. Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Grimes,
269 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. 1954). The Texas putative-spouse doctrine is by no means as broad as
that of Louisiana or California. See, e.g., In re Koonce, 380 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 1979);
Kunakoff v. Woods, 166 Cal. App. 2d 59, 332 P.2d 773 (Cal. App. 1958); LA. CIv. CODE
ANN. art. 96 (1999); Alfonso v. Alfonso, 739 So. 2d 946 (5th Cir. 1999); Thomason v. Thom-
ason, 776 So. 2d 553 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
30. Phillips v. Dow Chem. Co., 186 S.W.3d 121, 128-29 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.).
31. 172 S.W.3d 686, 701 n.21 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. denied).
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wife's reliance on that court's earlier decision in Miller v. Ludeman.32
The wife had relied on Miller to support the broad proposition that when-
ever both spouses are represented by counsel, neither owes any fiduciary
duty to the other. The Austin court explained that such a standard is
applicable only when spouses are engaged in divorce proceedings. 33
The couple in Sheshunoff had entered into a premarital agreement in
1971 and entered into a further agreement concerning their property in
1990 during the marriage. With the subsisting advice of individual coun-
sel, each began to negotiate a third agreement in 2002 and executed it the
following year. Two months later, the wife filed suit for divorce. As to
that third agreement, the husband testified that for tax and estate-plan-
ning purposes,34 large amounts of assets were transferred to the wife, and
marital liabilities were shifted to the husband. In response to his wife's
petition for divorce, the husband asserted that his wife had fraudulently
induced him to enter into the agreement, and he had done so without full
knowledge of his wife's assets. The trial court nevertheless concluded
that the agreement was enforceable and divided the property accordingly.
In reviewing these conclusions, the Austin Court of Appeals noted that
Texas enacted the Uniform Premarital Agreements Act with adaptations
of it for marital partitions and exchanges.35 Further legislative adjust-
ments were made in 1997 when common-law defenses (such as fraud)
were specifically preserved for interpreting section 4.105(a)(1) to mean
that fraud "equates involuntary execution with common-law duress."'36
The Austin appellate court nevertheless concluded that the husband
failed to raise a fact issue regarding his involuntary execution of the
agreement. 37
Several months after the trial court in Sheshunoff had granted partial
summary judgment to the wife on the issue raised by the husband's argu-
ment, the trial judge struck the husband's defenses and counterclaims
raised in his amended petition that asserted other common-law defenses
beyond his statutory involuntary execution and unconscionability de-
fenses.38 The appellate court concluded that, because the husband had
failed to raise additional defenses before the summary-judgment ruling,
his additional defenses were untimely and could not provide grounds for
summary judgment. 39 In the alternative, the Austin court ruled that sec-
tion 4.105(c) barred the husband's further assertion of common-law de-
fenses.40 The court then rejected the husband's argument that he was
32. 150 S.W.3d 592 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. denied), discussed in Joseph W. MC
Knight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 58 SMU L. REV. 877, 903-04 (2005).
33. Sheshunoff, 172 S.W.3d at 701 n.21.
34. See id. at 689 n.2.
35. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.005 (Vernon 1998) (enforcement of premarital agree-
ments and marital partitions and exchanges made during marriage).
36. Sheshunoff, 172 S.W.3d at 697.
37. Id. at 700.
38. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.105 (Vernon 1998).




entitled to damages and rescission and held that the trial court had erred
in severing that claim and referring the matter to arbitration.
In In re Fischer-Stoker,41 a couple entered into a written premarital
agreement listing various properties as the separate property of each.
Among the properties listed by the fiancde were an employer's savings
plan and shares in an individual retirement account ("IRA"). The couple
agreed that all funds generated by those separate funds would be the sep-
arate property of the income-providing fund owner. During their brief
marriage, the wife continued to make contributions from her salary to her
savings plan. In its division of property, the divorce court awarded the
husband half of the funds in the savings plan after deducting the ac-
count's value before marriage, which was designated as the wife's sepa-
rate property. The court also awarded to the parties funds from the IRA
computed in the same way.4 2 On appeal, the wife prevailed and was
awarded the husband's funds in the wife's accounts (the contributions she
made) that were clearly her separate property. The increase in value of
the IRA funds were also the wife's separate property.
The agreement had also provided that if any fund (separate or commu-
nity) was used to acquire property in their joint names, such property
would be jointly owned. The agreement went on to say that the spouses
might designate percentages of ownership to each in such funds, and, in
the absence of such an agreement, the principle of tracing would be used
to determine the shares. The court found that this provision clearly had
no application beyond its specific context and, therefore, would not apply
the doctrine of tracing to additions of community funds to the wife's sep-
arate accounts as they had agreed. 43
In Roman v. Roman,44 a married couple entered into an in-vitro-fertili-
zation agreement 45 in an effort to make it possible for the wife to have
the husband's child. The agreement (evidently provided by the fertiliza-
tion clinic) stated that embryos produced by the process would be the
"joint property46 of the spouses . . . based on regulations [that] may
change at any time" and that the embryos would be frozen for future use
but would be discarded if either of them should file a petition for di-
vorce. 47 The agreement also contained a provision that allowed the par-
ties to withdraw their consent to the disposition of the embryos and to
41. 174 S.W.3d 268 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
42. Id. at 272.
43. Id.
44. 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. granted).
45. For other approaches to gestation, see Lauren Andrew Hudgeons, Comment, Ges-
tational Agreements in Texas: A Brave New World, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 863 (2005). See also
Miryam Z. Wahrman, Fruit of the Womb: Artificial Reproductive Technologies & Jewish
Law, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 109, 110 (2005) (how Jewish law has "striven for and in
many cases achieved remarkable flexibility, enabling the application of modern medical
interventions for reproductive purposes").
46. Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 51.
47. Id. at 44.
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discontinue their participation in the program. 48 Just before the sched-
uled implanting of an embryo, the couple decided against that procedure
at the apparent urging of the husband. While the couple signed an agree-
ment a month later to have the three then-frozen embryos implanted af-
ter obtaining approval of a counselor, the process of counseling did not
proceed. About eight months later, each spouse filed a petition for di-
vorce. After engaging in mediation, the couple agreed in writing to "divi-
sion of the marital property, except for the frozen embryos. '49 At the
trial, the husband asked the court to uphold the agreement providing for
disposal of the embryos. The wife, on the other hand, desired the em-
bryos to be implanted, but if any child should be born as a consequence,
the husband "would not have parental rights or responsibilities." 50 Fol-
lowing the trial, the court ordered that the wife take possession of the
embryos. The husband then sought parental rights to any child born from
the embryos under section 160.706(a). 51 A month later, the trial court
filed findings of fact, stating that the parties had signed a mediation
agreement for the disposition of all their community property except the
three frozen embryos, which they agreed were community property.
52
The court concluded that the mediation agreement constituted a just and
right division of the community property and ordered that the three fro-
zen embryos be awarded to the wife. The husband appealed.
The Houston First District Court of Appeals cautiously began its han-
dling of the matter by saying that it responded to the issue presented "as
narrowly as possible in anticipation that the issue will ultimately be re-
solved by the Texas Legislature. '53 The court noted that at least three
other states (Florida, New Hampshire, and Louisiana) had enacted legis-
lation concerning frozen embryos.54 The court then reviewed the rele-
vant case law. In a case dealing with a written agreement concerning
frozen embryos, Tennessee's highest court had concluded that the hus-
band had the right not to beget a child, and the court therefore reversed
the award of the embryos to the wife. The Tennessee court pointed out
that "the husband's interest in avoiding parenthood was more significant
than the wife's interest in donating the embryos to another couple for
implantation.55 In that case, there was no agreement of the couple for
disposition of the embryos, but the court stated that "an agreement re-
garding disposition of any untransferred pre-embryos in the event of con-
tingencies (such as the death of one or more of the parties, divorce,
48. Id. at 51.
49. Id. at 43.
50. Id. If premarital-agreement provisions in TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.003 (Vernon
1998) had been applicable, the agreement to release the husband from parental responsi-
bility would have failed.
51. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.706(a) (Vernon 1998).
52. Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 41-43.
53. Id. at 44.
54. Id. at 54.
55. Id. at 45 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub
nom., Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)).
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financial reversals, or abandonment of the program) should be presumed
valid and should be enforced .... "56 In reaching a similar conclusion,
New York's highest court held that a couple's agreement should control
the disposition of embryos. 57 A New Jersey intermediate appellate court
rejected an alleged oral agreement to destroy frozen embryos in case of
divorce on the ground that an agreement to procreate is itself contrary to
public policy and that the wife's right to have the embryos destroyed did
not infringe on the husband's constitutional right to procreate because he
would still be able to father children. 58 In affirming this conclusion, the
New Jersey Supreme Court nevertheless said that "persuasive reasons ex-
ist for enforcing pre-embryo disposition agreements,"5 9 that a wife who
wished to have the embryos destroyed should not be forced to be a bio-
logical parent against her will,60 and that either spouse has the right to
rescind an in-vitro-fertilization agreement and thus to achieve destruction
of the embryos. 61 In another case, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
held that the couple had not entered into a binding agreement in signing
certain forms supplied by a medical clinic in relation to disposition of
embryos.62 In two other somewhat different frozen-embryo storage-
agreement cases (one in Washington and another in Iowa), the Washing-
ton court concluded that the agreement governed the disputes, 63 whereas
the Iowa court held that, in the absence of a provision in the agreement
for disposition of the embryos, mutual consent of the spouses was
required.64
In this case, the Houston court concluded that Texas's Uniform Parent-
age Act 65 (in which the eventuality of divorce is mentioned but in a dif-
ferent context from that before the court) did not resolve this dispute.
The court went on to note, however, that in the case of a gestation agree-
ment between the donor and the prospective gestational donee, either
intended parent, if the donee is married, may terminate the agreement
under the provisions of section 160.759(a) of the Family Code. 66 The
court thus held that Texas's public policy allows a married couple to enter
into an agreement providing for an embryo's disposition before implanta-
tion under changed circumstances. The couple's agreement had specifi-
cally provided that "[w]e have been advised that each embryo resulting
from the fertilization of the wife's oocytes by the husband's sperm shall
be the joint property of both partners based on currently accepted princi-
ples regarding legal ownership of human sperm and oocytes, . . . [i]f...
56. Id. (quoting Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597).
57. Kass v. Kass, 69 N.E.2d 174, 176-78 (1998).
58. J.B. v. M.B., 751 A.2d 613, 618-19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
59. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001).
60. Id. at 717.
61. Id. at 719.
62. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1056-57 (Mass. 2000).
63. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).
64. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
65. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.704(a)-(b) (Vernon 1998).
66. Id. § 160.759(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
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either of us files for divorce ... we hereby authorize and direct ... that
[.. t]he frozen embryos(s) shall be . . .[d]iscarded." This agreement
went on to say that "we understand that we are free to withdraw our
consent as to disposition of our embryo(s) .... ",67 This provision applied
because each spouse refused to release the embryos to the other as the
agreement allowed.
It is striking that despite the couple's agreement referring to the em-
bryos in the gestational agreement as "joint property" and in their media-
tion agreement as "community property," which they did not agree to
divide, no argument suggested that they might be subject to the provi-
sions of article XVI, section 15 of the Texas Constitution concerning par-
tition of community property. Though that provision deals only with a
partition (or exchange) of community property rather than destruction of
it, a partition to the husband could have resulted in destruction. The clos-
est that the court came to an allusion to applicability of the property-
partition concept was its quotation from the Iowa Supreme Court's com-
ment68 that "embryos are fundamentally distinct from the chattels, real
estate, and money that are the subjects of antenuptial agreements. '69
But in light of what the parties had agreed in typifying the embryos as
community or joint property, their agreement was controlling to partition
the embryos along with the other community property. If the agreement
had been interpreted as incident to divorce under section 7.006, either
party could have rescinded it unilaterally. 70 If interpreted as a constitu-
tional marital partition, the agreement would have required the result
reached by the Houston court. It is also worth noting that the sort of
marital agreement in issue here and in other cases makes it clear that the
spouses and this court viewed embryos outside the womb very differently
from those in the womb.
B. CHARACTERIZATION BY TRACING
Two cases involved proof of separate character of marital property by
tracing. In Todd v. Todd,71 the wife claimed a farm owned before mar-
riage as her separate property and testified to its location on a particular
country road. The husband complained on appeal that she had failed to
offer documentary evidence of her assertion of a precise description of
the property and thus failed to overcome the community presumption.
The Dallas Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, 72 held that the
wife had clearly and convincingly identified the property to establish her
separate ownership. 73
67. Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 50-52.
68. Id. at 48.
69. Id. at 48 n.10.
70. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.006 (Vernon 2002).
71. 173 S.W.3d 126 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied).
72. Id. at 129.
73. Id. at 128.
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In Pace v. Pace,74 before the Dallas Court of Appeals, the husband
complained that his wife had not offered sufficient evidence of her sepa-
rate ownership of their home and of a particular investment account.
Three weeks after the parties' marriage, the wife instructed the account
manager of her premarital management account to remove all dividend
income that might be deposited there during the marriage, as well as all
interest then added to the account, and to deposit those funds in an in-
vestment account so that no community property would be held in the
management account.7 5 A witness corroborated the wife's affidavit that
all dividends deposited and interest earned by the management account
were paid into the investment account, thus leaving only separate funds
in the management account. The court went on to say that "if the correct
amount was swept [into the investment account], mixing of dollars alone
does not result in commingling. ' 76 Using funds from the management
account, the wife then contracted to buy a house for which she paid ear-
nest money, the cost of an inspection, and the rest of the purchase price.
Her husband asked to have his name put on the deed for the house "be-
cause he did not want to feel like a tenant in the house."' 77 The wife
complied with his request, and the couple lived in the house until they
separated several years later. During that time, the wife paid all taxes,
insurance, and maintenance on the house from the account from which
all dividends and other income paid into the account during marriage had
been withdrawn. Although taking title in the name of both spouses gave
rise to a presumption of a gift of half the property interest to the hus-
band,78 the trial court concluded that the wife's evidence clearly and con-
vincingly established her separate ownership of the house. The trial court
also found that a management trust created by the wife during marriage
with pre-marital assets also constituted her separate property. All com-
munity income had also been removed from the trust. On appeal, the
appellate court was satisfied that the wife's account manager had swept
all community property from the management account every month as
her manager testified, affirming the trial court's characterization of the
account as separate property.79 As to the home, the court held that the
husband had waived the issue of gift to him by his failure to comply with
Rule 3880 in not preparing an adequate brief.
74. 160 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied).
75. With or without professional advice, the wife was following the mode of manage-
ment for maintaining a separate property account in which community funds have been
deposited as approved in MCKinley v. MCKinley, 496 SW.2d 540 (Tex. 1973), in using what
is referred to as the "identical sum inference"-based on the deliberate removal of the
precise amount of community funds in the account.
76. See Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 167-68 (Tex. 1975).
77. For a somewhat similar situation, see Patterson v. Metzing, 424 S.W.2d 255, 259
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967, no writ), in which the husband's evidence was insuf-
ficient to rebut the presumption of gift.
78. Pace, 160 S.W.3d at 710. See Smith v. Strahan, 16 Tex. 314 (1856).
79. Pace, 160 S.W.3d at 714-15.
80. Id. at 715 n.4 (citing Trawick v. Trawick, 671 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984,
no writ); Farrow v. Farrow, 238 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1951, no writ)).
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In Russell v. Russell81 the husband's sworn inventory was struck be-
cause it was not timely filed; so the Houston First District Court of Ap-
peals only had the wife's inventory and valuation before them. At the
hearing, the husband had testified that his premarital car and savings ac-
count on which he wrote checks were in his father's name. His other
properties, which were listed in the wife's inventory as his separate prop-
erty, consisted of an undivided retirement account and a life insurance
policy. The trial court nevertheless determined that these were commu-
nity properties and so divided them. The Houston appellate court con-
cluded that the wife's inventory and statement at the hearing constituted
judicial admissions sufficient to overcome the community presumption,
and the husband was entitled to a new trial for division of the property.
The decision of the Waco court in LeGrand-Brock v. Brock82 is very
brief. Before the divorcing couple's marriage, the husband owned shares
in a corporation. During the marriage, the corporation underwent liqui-
dation, and the husband received liquidating dividends from what had
been retained and recent earnings of the corporation. At the divorce
trial, the wife offered testimony of an expert to the effect that the distri-
butions were community property. The trial court excluded this testi-
mony as irrelevant and found that the liquidating dividends were the
husband's separate property. The wife appealed the ruling on the evi-
dence and the characterization of the property, and the majority of the
court granted her appeal and remanded the case to the trial court. In his
dissent, Chief Justice Gray followed the overwhelming authority of Texas
precedent in concluding that liquidating dividends83 of a separately held
corporate interest (like stock dividends from the same source84) are the
separate property of the shareholders.
C. REIMBURSEMENT
In Hale v. Hale,85 while married the husband had made gifts to his
church of about $50,000 over six years. His gifts had amounted to about
one-sixth of community estate at the date of divorce, and the court or-
dered him to pay the wife $25,000.86 This was a simple reimbursement
case and somewhat reminiscent of Carnes v. Meador,87 in which the hus-
81. No. 01-04-00984-CV, 2006 WL 241476 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 2,
2006, pet. granted).
82. No. 01-04-00984-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 869 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
Feb. 2, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.); Moore v. Key, No. 05-02-00809-CV, 2003 WL 194725
(Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 30, 2003, pet. denied).
83. See Hilliard v. Hilliard, 725 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ); Fuhr-
man v. Fuhrman, 302 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1957, writ dism'd).
84. See, e.g., Wells v. Hiskett, 288 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1956, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Scofield v. Weiss, 131 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1942).
85. No. 04-05-00314-CV, 2006 WL 166518 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Jan. 25, 2006, pet.
denied).
86. Id. at *4.
87. 533 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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band had lavished a disproportionate share of a modest community estate
on his daughter and son-in-law.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals's opinion in Avila v. Avila88 con-
cerned a wife's claim for economic contribution for money she contrib-
uted to building a house on her husband's separate realty. At the divorce
trial, the wife had presented evidence of five checks for specific amounts
of her separate property deposited to the couple's joint checking account
or simply delivered to her husband as well as some other checks allegedly
meant to pay for various items used in the house's construction. The use
of particular amounts of her money for construction of the home and to
what extent these alleged contributions were made to enhance the "eq-
uity value" of the realty from the date of the marriage to the time of
divorce were not shown. The wife had therefore failed to prove an eco-
nomic contribution of a specific amount of her separate funds used to
enhance the value of the husband's separate property under section
3.402(a)(1), (5), and (6).89
In Garcia v. Garcia,90 the El Paso Court of Appeals also dealt with an
economic-contribution computation, in that instance under section
3.402(a)(6). While the first five subsections of section 3.402(a) deal with
discharge of liens on marital property in various circumstances, subsec-
tion (a)(6) does not deal primarily with a lien but with a capital improve-
ment on a marital estate as an economic contribution producing an
equitable lien. Speaking for the court, Justice McClure began her analysis
by stating that "[glenerally speaking, these amendments [of 2001] were
not well received by family law practitioners and both bench and bar
have struggled with their application." 91 The court then properly af-
firmed the ordinary reimbursement claim of the wife for $3,000 of her
separate funds expended as a payment for the purchase of certain com-
munity property. In light of the inception-of-title rule, the court made a
puzzling observation that the property did not take on its community
character until the time of closing. Thus, the initial earnest-money pay-
ment did not give a factual interest in the property but a mere right of
reimbursement. 92 The court went on to classify an additional $7,000 of
separate property expended for later improvements on the realty as an
economic contribution under section 3.402(a)(6). The court suggested
that in drafting orders for ordinary reimbursement and economic contri-
butions, such items should be referred to as such93 (though, in the broad
sense, both are types of reimbursement) in order to distinguish the statu-
tory creation from "common law [or Spanish] reimbursement."
88. No. 04-04-00196-CV, 2005 WL 708431 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Mar. 30, 2005, no
pet. h.).
89. Id. at *1-2; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.402(a)(1), (5), (6) (Vernon Supp. 2005).
90. 170 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, no pet.).
91. Id. at 649. For an equally forthright comment on 2005 federal bankruptcy legisla-
tion see In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005).
92. Garcia, 170 S.W.3d at 650 (citing In re Royal, 107 S.W.3d 846, 851-52 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 2003, no pet.)).
93. Id. at 652.
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Another instance of economic contribution is described in Moroch v.
Collins.94 There, the couple entered into a marital partition in 1987,
thereby converting all their community property to separate property of
each, except for their residence and a bank account, which remained
community property.95 In their divorce proceeding, the wife asked for
economic contribution, asserting that she used a significant amount of her
separate property as earnest money and mortgage payments for a renova-
tion of their residence, and those expenditures occurred before the mari-
tal partition. The divorce court awarded the residence to the wife in
satisfaction of her claim for economic contribution. In the partition
agreement, the parties had waived any claim for reimbursement against
the separate property of the other but not as against any community
property.96 Thus, any claim that the wife had for capital improvement of
the community estate or contribution to the purchase price thereof was
maintained.
On appeal, the husband asserted that the wife's payment of her sepa-
rate property constituted a gift to him of half of that amount and that title
to the property was taken in the names of both spouses in 1979. The
court nevertheless found that whatever the presumptive consequence of
that payment at the time of purchase, the characterization of the resi-
dence as community property in the marital partition was clearly control-
ling. Further, the court concluded that the wife had succeeded in tracing
all of her funds claimed as payments reimbursable to her separate estate.
Because the residence constituted the only community property available
to discharge the wife's economic contribution, satisfaction of her claim
was properly discharged by the award of the residence under section
3.403(d), within the limits of that section that "the amount of the claim
... may not exceed the equity in the property on the date of dissolution
of marriage. '97
One judge on the panel dissented from the court's conclusion on the
ground that the 1987 agreement precluded the wife's claim. The dissent-
ing judge relied on the language of the partition characterizing the resi-
dence as community property "in its entirety," thus precluding the wife's
economic-contribution claim.98
Chu v. Hong9 9 dealt with the more familiar non-statutory type of reim-
bursement-an appeal by a lawyer in relation to a community donut
shop, which the attorney's clients had sought to buy from a husband and
wife. After negotiations between the lawyers and sellers, the seller-wife
withdrew from participation in the sale despite the buyers' lawyer's threat
94. 174 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied). Cf. Raymond v. Raymond,
190 S.W.3d 77 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (the claimed economic con-
tributions were unproved).
95. Moroch, 174 S.W.3d at 854.
96. id. at 859.
97. Id. at 867.
98. Id. at 873.
99. 185 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. filed).
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of litigation against the sellers. The husband, who still hoped to sell the
property, negotiated with the buyers' lawyer, who knew of the wife's un-
willingness to sell. The lawyer then prepared an amended sales agree-
ment showing the husband as the sole owner of the property and acting
alone. With the buyers' belief that the husband had sole authority, the
property was transferred to the buyers. The husband then promptly
wired the proceeds of the sale to Korea and soon followed the money.
Each spouse brought suit for divorce, and the wife brought an indepen-
dent suit against the buyers and the husband to set aside the sale. The
wife also sued the attorney for his fraudulent involvement in selling the
shop and conspiracy with her husband to defraud her. All the suits were
consolidated for trial.
The court granted the divorce and divided the community estate. The
court divested the buyers of their interest in the shop, which was awarded
to the wife. The trial court responded to the wife's suit against her hus-
band for his intentional tort by an award of damages. Only the attorney
appealed the judgment of the trial court. In reliance on Connell v. Con-
nell,100 the appellate court concluded that the husband's constructive
fraud on his wife in disposing of a community asset and its proceeds, the
detriment suffered by his wife, and the connivance of the buyers' attorney
imposed liability on the attorney who knowingly participated in the hus-
band's wrongful scheme. The court relied on the Texas Uniform Transfer
Act, which provides relief to a creditor against a debtor who transfers
property to "hinder, delay or defraud" the debtor.10 1 The definition of a
creditor in section 24.002102 includes a claimant-spouse. The court con-
cluded that the inclusion of "spouse" in the definition was meant to sup-
port and protect the concept of interspousal reimbursement because so
many early decisions 0 3 on the subject arose as a result of a spouse's
fraudulent transfers to injure the other spouse. In her dissenting analysis
of the attorney's liability for conspiracy, Justice Gardner inferred that a
wife would have had such a cause of action against her husband but that,
in such a case as this, it would be precluded by the Texas Supreme Court's
decision in Schlueter v. Schlueter.104 The actual intent of the Texas drafts-
men of section 24.002, however, was to emphasize the deprived spouse's
claim to spousal reimbursement. Justice Gardner nevertheless took the
view that the wife's claim against the attorney might still be for conspir-
acy to commit fraud on the community estate.l05 Thus, the attorney's
liability might be analogous to that of the recipient of a fraudulent trans-
fer in Cohrs v. Scott.1°6
100. 889 S.W.2d 534, 541 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ. dism'd).
101. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005(a)(1) (Vernon 2002).
102. Id. § 24.002.
103. See Richard F. Dole, Jr. & Vernon Teofan, The Nonuniform Texas "Uniform"
Fraudulent Transfer Act, 42 Sw. L.J. 1029, 139 n.111 (1989).
104. 975 S.W.2d 584, 585, 590 (Tex. 1998).
105. Chu, 185 S.W.3d at 518-19.
106. 338 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. 1960). See also Miller v. Miller, 285 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1955, no writ).
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III. MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY OF
MARITAL PROPERTY
A. MANAGEMENT
Recently reported appellate decisions have tended to plow old ground,
and many of the disputes really did not merit pursuing at the appellate
level, except by those who were sued successfully for little, if any, cause.
The arguments advanced by the widow-executrix of her late husband's
estate and the facts on which she relied in Lemaster v. Top Level Printing
Ink, Inc.10 7 are very reminiscent of similar matters in Williams v. Portland
State Bank,10 8 though that case is nowhere alluded to in the decision of
the Dallas appellate court. In Williams, the bank prepared notes and a
deed of trust covering two tracts of community land as security for a loan
to the husband. One tract was held in the names of both spouses and the
other in the name of the husband alone. The wife declined to execute the
instruments, and a new note and deed of trust were prepared for the hus-
band's signature, and the loan was concluded. On the husband's default,
the bank sought foreclosure of the deed of trust. In the litigation that
followed, the Beaumont appellate court concluded that the foreclosure of
the note on the property in the names of both spouses was controlled by
what is now section 3.102(c) (Managing Community Property) and that
the husband lacked authority to deal with the property alone because, as
the state of the title indicated, the property was subject to the spouses'
joint management. As to foreclosure on the land in the husband's name,
the court held that under what is now section 3.104 (Protection of Third
Persons), the bank, without knowing more, might have safely dealt with
the husband alone. The court held that the bank's knowledge that the
wife had refused to sign the loan instruments put the bank on inquiry
with respect to the wife's interest, and by the exercise of ordinary dili-
gence, the bank would have discovered that the husband lacked authority
to act alone because that property was subject to the spouse's joint man-
agement, as it had been acquired with jointly managed community prop-
erty. The appellate court, nevertheless, allowed recovery against the
husband for his half-interest in each tract; it is in that respect that the
court's conclusion has been regarded as erroneous. 10 9 The bank's injury
was therefore self-inflicted by its initial assumption that it would achieve
joinder of both spouses as borrowers without any prior inquiry as to own-
ership and management of the proffered collateral.
In Lemaster, the husband and two others orally agreed to form a part-
nership in 1997. In 2001, they decided that their agreement should be
memorialized by an instrument in writing. Under the space provided for
107. 136 S.W.3d 745 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.).
108. 514 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1975), writ dism'd, 18 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 210
(1975) (agreed motion to affirm denied, and agreed motion setting aside order granting
application for writ of error and dismissing application for writ of error granted).




signatures of the partners (referred to as stockholders), there was a place
for the wives "to indicate [that] they agreed to the contract."' 110 In re-
jecting the widow's argument that the agreement was subject to the
wives' approval, the court said that "the agreement itself shows [that] the
wives were not signing the agreement as parties""1 I and "[t]he agreement
itself also shows that the parties intended it to be effective irrespective of
the wives signatures [sic] because it states [that] it was merely a memori-
alization of an earlier oral agreement between the stockholders."'1 2 As
one of the partners testified: "the reason they wanted the wives to sign
the agreement was to avoid the litigation they were currently in." 113
In their original partnership agreement, carried forward in the written
instrument, it had been understood that on the death of any one of them,
his share would be sold to the others at its book-value. After the death of
one of the partners, it was realized that his widow had not signed. Acting
as her husband's independent executrix, the widow resisted the efforts of
the surviving partners to enforce the agreement on the ground that the
property had been subject to her joint management. Just as the bank had
provided that both the husband and his wife should join as borrowers in
Williams, the widow in Lemaster asserted that the wives were required to
join in the agreement, and her failure to sign put the partners on inquiry
as to the joint management of community interest at stake.114 The trial
judge in Lemaster, however, directed a jury verdict in favor of the stock-
holders to enforce their agreement against the husband's estate. Unlike
the court's conclusion in Williams, there was no proof that anyone was
put on inquiry of anything by the failure of the wife to sign, and it was not
proved that anyone noted her failure to sign or that she had refused to do
so. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment up-
holding the partnership agreement.
B. LIABILITY
In In re Gevin,'115 the husband and wife held an interest in an out-of-
state partnership that they partitioned between them as separate prop-
erty. A judgment had been taken against the husband for his indebted-
ness to a creditor. His wife was neither jointly nor severally liable on that
debt nor a party to that action. In their bankruptcy that followed, the
husband's indebtedness was not discharged, but the bankruptcy court en-
joined the husband's creditors from recovering against money recovered
by the wife for emotional distress as her separate property. The hus-
110. Lemaster, 136 S.W.3d at 747.
111. Id. at 748.
112. Id. at 749.
113. Id. at 747.
114. See Miller v. Miller, 700 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) and
its progeny, cited in JOSEPH W. MCKNIGHT & WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR., TEXAS MATRIMO-
NIAL PROPERTY LAW 269-75 (9th ed. 2006), for consequence of contract in which the wife
had joinder but without full disclosure of the contract's implications.
115. 337 B.R. 854 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005).
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band's judgment creditors then sought to levy execution against the wife's
partnership interest. The ex-wife brought suit in the bankruptcy court to
enforce the injunction rendered in her interest under section 524 of the
Bankruptcy Act.116 Relying on In re Torres,117 the bankruptcy court held
that it had jurisdiction to enforce the court's damage award as an appro-
priate remedy for the ex-wife's injury under section 524.
In Providian National Bank v. Ebarb,n 8 after the spouses were di-
vorced, the ex-wife's creditor brought suit against both former spouses
for recovery of a debt incurred by the ex-wife during their marriage. The
ex-wife did not appeal the default judgment against her, and no liability
was found against the ex-husband. The creditor-bank appealed. Though
the facts of the dispute as related by the Beaumont Court of Appeals are
not altogether clear, it appears that a bank had issued a credit card to the
wife in the name of both spouses, but the contract between the wife and
the bank included no specific provision concerning the husband's liability.
When the couple divorced, the wife's debt to the bank had been only
partially discharged. In its appeal, the creditor relied on the long-discred-
ited argument that, because the wife had incurred a "community debt,"
the husband was therefore liable. The bank relied on the authority of
Cockerham v. Cockerham,n 9 in which the Texas Supreme Court (in a 5-
to-4 decision) had concluded that the husband's financial support of his
wife's business ventures and public acknowledgment of her debts as his
own constituted joint-venture liability. The Beaumont court rejected the
creditor's arguments, pointing out that, although the husband had paid
some of the wife's monthly bills, there was no evidence of a contract or
any agreement as to his liability to the bank and no assumption of his
wife's liability as his own.120 The court rejected the bank's claim against
the husband under section 3.201 (Spousal Liability), enacted in 1987.121
The bank had failed to establish that the husband was "personally liable
for the debt, either through [the wife's] acts or through his own acts. 1 22
In Wolfram v. Wolfram,123 the San Antonio Court of Appeals dealt
with an ex-wife's attempt to enforce a judgment debt arising out of a
California divorce decree against the deceased ex-husband's subsequent
widow. Just before his death, the ex-wife had recovered a California
judgment against her ex-husband for unpaid ex-spousal support. The
judgment was, however, barred from enforcement in Texas by the run-
ning of the Texas statute of limitations. 124 After concluding that domesti-
cation of the California judgment had not been achieved by a timely suit,
the ex-wife sued her ex-husband's widow, who had not been a party to
116. 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2005).
117. 309 B.R. 643, 648 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004).
118. 180 S.W.3d 898 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2005, no pet.).
119. 527 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1975).
120. Providian Nat' Bank, 180 S.W.3d at 901-02.
121. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.201 (Vernon 1998).
122. Providian Nat'l Bank, 180 S.W.3d at 902.
123. 165 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, no pet.).
124. Id. at 758 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.006(b) (Vernon 1997)).
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the ex-wife's California suit. Because the widow had not been a party,
even if the judgment had been properly domesticated in Texas, a writ of
execution on the judgment could not have run against the widow. 125
It was said once again in In re Whitus126 that section 3.102 is a Texas
exemption statute that the federal Treasury can ignore in order to recover
a debtor-spouse's interest in community property subject to the sole man-
agement of the other spouse 127 under section 6334(a) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code.128 The court reiterated that the United States "is not
concerned that the Texas Family Code provision is not specifically de-
nominated as an exemption."'1 29 It is simply a rule inherent to the nature
of a solely managed community property interest as declared by statute in
1967.130 In this instance, the controlling principle was the Congressional
enactment and thus a rule of federal supremacy: the right of the Internal
Revenue Service to seize the debtor-taxpayer's interest in the community
property subject to the other spouse's sole management. It was beside
the point that the type of property in issue was, if community property
controlled by the husband, beyond the wife's reach and hence beyond
that of her ordinary creditors. The yet unanswered question, however, is
the nature of the remainder of the property after satisfaction of the Reve-
nue Service's levy on the taxpayer's community interest. Is the amount
remaining still community property, or has it been transformed into the
non-debtor spouse's separate property by operation of the supremacy
doctrine? The latter conclusion should be the result, despite conclusions
to the contrary in Washington and New Mexico.13' If the effect of appli-
cation of federal law does not produce an involuntary partition to pro-
duce equal shares of separate property, federal levies may continue to be
applied until the non debtor-spouse's share is extinguished. Entry into a
premarital or marital partition to avoid an existing debt to the United
States is precluded by article XVI, section 15 of the Texas Constitution. 32
In Brown v. Zimmerman 33 the Dallas appellate court held that divi-
sion of property on divorce did not relieve the ex-wife of an obligation to
discharge her note to a finance company owned by her husband because
the divorce decree was silent as to the note and allocated the property
125. Id.
126. 240 B.R. 705 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1999).
127. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6334(a) (West 2005).
128. Whitus, 240 B.R. at 708 (quoting Broday v. United States, 455 F.2d 1097, 1101 (5th
Cir. 1972)). See also United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2003); Medaris v. United States,
884 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1989).
129. Broday, 455 F.2d at 1101.
130. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.002(b)(2) (Vernon 1998). See Joseph W. McKnight,
Family Law: Husband and Wife, 44 Sw. L.J. 1, 38 (1990).
131. See deElche v. Jacobsen, 622 P.2d 835 (Wash. 1980); McDonald v. Senn, 204 P.2d
990 (N.M. 1949).
132. For a related but not necessarily analogous consideration of planning techniques to
avoid Medicaid Estate Recovery, see MOLLY DEAR ABSAIRE, ET AL., SAVE My HOME!
SAVING YOUR HOME, FARMER RANCH FROM MEDICAID ESTATE RECOVERY IN TEXAS
(Elder Law Trio Press 2005).
133. 160 S.W.3d 695 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.).
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securing the note to the wife as separate property. Chorman v. McCor-
mick is a somewhat similar debtor-creditor case but still a significantly
different one. 34 Their land was bought during the marriage and subject
to a lien for the entire purchase price. The land was left undivided by the
divorce court in 1985 and thereby became a tenancy in common of the
former spouses. The ex-wife, however, was awarded the right to occupy
the land and was in possession. The husband was the original purchaser
of the community land, and his father had discharged the purchase
money lien of the unpaid seller. To discharge his obligation to his father,
the son conveyed his half interest to his father, leaving one-half of the
indebtedness to the father still unpaid. The father then brought suit
against the son's ex-wife seeking, as he alleged, to impose his equitable
purchase money lien on her share of the undivided property. He had,
however, waited more than four years after paying the whole purchase
price. Hence, the father asserted that he was seeking to enforce his equi-
table lien and not the debt owed to him. The appellate court held that the
father had not acquired an equitable lien on the property because there
was no implied contract with the ex-wife to support it. Therefore, his
cause of action was barred by the four-year statute of limitation.135 The
significant difference between Brown and Chorman was that in the for-
mer, the wife was a maker of the note, whereas in Chorman, she was not.
Even so, if the father had recovered a judgment against his son before
divorce, he could then have foreclosed his lien judgment before or after
the divorce within four years.
C. EXEMPT PROPERTY
1. Business Homestead
In 1999, the residential-homestead provisions of the Texas Constitution
were amended to provide that a homestead "shall be used for the pur-
poses of a home, or as both an urban home and a place to exercise a
calling or business" 136 and that the business homestead must be contigu-
ous to the residential homestead. Disputes with respect to a business
homestead are very uncommon because the configuration of a business
homestead contiguous to a residential homestead is now unusual. In In re
Jay,13 7 the Chapter 13 debtor-husband and his non-debtor wife sought to
cancel the deed that they described as their business homestead, although
they did not maintain a residence there. In January of 2000 (the statute
applied the 1999 constitutional definition to all Texas homesteads "when-
ever created,"1 38 effective January 1, 2000), the couple conveyed the
property to a lender who agreed to erect a new building on the premises,
134. 172 S.W.3d 22 (Tex, App.-Amarillo 2005, no pet. h.).
135. Id. at 26.
136. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51.
137. 432 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2005). The decision at first instance is discussed in Joseph
W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 58 SMU L. REV. 877, 892-94 (2005).
138. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(d) (Vernon 2000).
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which would be rented to the grantors. As a term of the subsequent lease
from the grantee-lender effective April 1, 2000, the grantors were given
an option to repurchase the property from the grantees. Some months
later, the lessor sought to eject the tenants for nonpayment of the rent,
and the husband filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court concluded
that the sale-leaseback arrangement was a pretended sale of a business
homestead because "[a]ll pretended sales of the homestead involving any
condition of defeasance [are] void,"1139 and this conclusion was affirmed
by the federal district judge. The lessor appealed.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the amended definition of
the urban business homestead to include as applying to business premises
contiguous to a residential homestead could apply to this property be-
cause the deed was executed in January 2000. As the grantors had never
lived on adjacent property, however, neither property could qualify as the
grantor's business or residential homestead 140 and was not entitled to
homestead protection. The contracts between the parties could not relate
back to "the execution of the warranty deed in January 2000," in order to
fall under the old business homestead definition, or to the December
1999 lease signing because there was insufficient evidence of a contract to
amount to an enforceable undertaking. The simplification of this obser-
vation is that leased premises qualify as a business homestead.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Higginbotham would have reversed the
conclusion of the bankruptcy and district courts treating this as not a real
sale, but merely a pretended one based only on the grantor's desire to
borrow money with which to construct business premises and to repay the
loan by repurchase of the land for the amount advanced by the grantor.
Further, he stated that the bankruptcy judge went astray in that the stat-
ute altering the scope of the constitutional definition of an urban home-
stead did not become effective until January 1, 2000, and "any retroactive
application for transactions occurring before January 1, 2000 would alter
the substantive rights and obligations of the parties in violation of the
Texas Constitution's prohibitions against ex post facto or retroactive
laws. 11 4 1 This deed, he went on to reiterate, was thus "a disguised
mortgage. '142
2. Residential Homestead
In re Gandy143 is another of the long line of cases involving a home-
stead claim to property partially improved for occupancy but never actu-
ally occupied as a home. The debtor had planned to live in his travel
trailer on the property, but had only constructed a driveway and made
arrangements for utilities. The bankruptcy court rejected the debtor's
139. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a), (c).
140. Jay, 432 F.3d at 326-27.
141. Id. at 329.
142. Id. at 331-32.
143. 327 B.R. 807 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
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claim under the Bankruptcy Code that the property was land that the
debtor "uses as a residence, ' 144 despite the possibility of its being treated
in the future as exempt from creditor's claims.145
The deceased husband in Mangrum v. Conrad146 devised to his widow
one-half of his estate on condition that she vacate their home 147 and
waive her statutory right of an allowance in lieu of a homestead. 148 The
widow did not, however, leave the home for two years. There is no time
limit as to the widow's making an election in favor of her right as a surviv-
ing spouse, and she finally made a written election to take under the will.
As a matter of law, the testator could clearly force her to make the choice
within a specific time between her homestead rights and the provision
made for her in the will; there can be no doubt that she could be put to
such a testamentary election for the right of homestead occupancy. 149
The executrix nevertheless asserted that the widow had implicitly made
her election in favor of her right as a surviving spouse by maintaining
possession of the home. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the
probate court in favor of the widow, whose response to the provisions of
the will were deemed as timely made.
The dispute in McKee v. Wilson150 seems to have arisen from a funda-
mental misconception of some homeowners that the homestead exemp-
tion protects a homestead from foreclosure of a valid lien acquired before
the property became a homestead. In this instance, a building contractor
had acquired a mechanic's lien for the construction of a house that be-
came the homestead of the property owner when the building was com-
pleted. When the couple entered into an oral contract with the builder to
construct the house, which was later reduced to writing, the couple al-
ready owned and occupied a homestead. In this instance, the owners as-
144. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (2005).
145. Gandy, 327 B.R. at 808-09. For another situation involving the definition of a
homestead in a debtor-creditor context, see In re Blair, 334 B.R. 374 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2005). In that case, the court held that the increase in value of a homestead (resulting in
part from payments made during the 1,215 days immediately before the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition) did not constitute an "interest" in homestead property sufficient to come
within provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act if the
bankrupt had chosen state exemptions allowing protection of a homestead interest of up to$125,000. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 522(p) (2005)). For other problems arising under the act,
see Lawrence R. Ahern, III, Homestead and Other Exemptions under the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act: Observations on "Asset Protection" after
2005, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 585 (2005).
146. 185 S.W.3d 602 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
147. The will forced her to choose between the bequest provided for her and her home-
stead right to occupy the family home, which was the husband's separate property. Id. at
604.
148. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 273 (Vernon 2003).
149. Miller v. Miller, 149 Tex. 543, 235 S.W.2d 624 (1951). See also Garner v. Estate of
Long, 49 S.W.3d 920 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied), discussed in Joseph W.
M'Knight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 55 SMU L. REV. 1035, 1056-58 (2002). A
widow can also be put to an equitable election between a legacy from her husband and a
legacy to another he had made of her interest in the community estate. Wright v. Wright,
154 Tex. 138, 274 S.W.2d 670 (1955).
150. 174 S.W.3d 842 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, no pet.).
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serted that a lien could not have arisen on this property in favor of the
builder because the agreement was not "in writing" (as required by sec-
tion 53.254 of the Property Code1 51 ) and the lien remained unrecorded
until after the couple had moved into their new home. The court held
that because the owners of the new house did not occupy it until they had
moved from their prior homestead, the builder had already acquired his
statutory mechanic's lien on the new home, and his compliance with sec-
tion 53.354 was irrelevant. 152
Dominguez v. Castaneda1 53 involved somewhat similar facts. In 2002,
the homeowner brought suit against her creditor seeking to enjoin fore-
closure of a deed-of-trust lien fixed on the property more than four years
from the time that the loan was made. 154 In 1996, the wife had given her
husband a general power of attorney to handle her business affairs.
Shortly thereafter, as his wife's agent, the husband borrowed money from
the lender, giving a deed of trust on a house allegedly owned by the wife
but not actually acquired by her until 1998 (by devise as to one-half and
the other half by purchase). The husband and wife lived in a house next
to the one covered by the deed of trust. The lender filed the deed of trust
for record about a month later. During 1998, the husband made only two
payments on the note. In 2000, the wife filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy,
and her schedule showed her indebtedness to the lender. Although the
wife sought to rely on the running of the four-year statute of limitation 155
to bar the lender's claim, her acknowledgment of the debt in her Chapter
13 schedule had revived it.156 The wife also asserted that the property
subject to the deed of trust was her homestead and thus exempt from the
lender's claim. The court rejected this argument, stating that even though
the house may have later become her home, the deed-of-trust lien fixed
on the property when she acquired it (by operation of the after-acquired
property doctrine) prevented its being claimed as not subject to the lien.
The lien was thus fully enforceable.1 57 The wife had acquired title to the
land, and the lender's lien fixed on it simultaneously.
The transfer of a homestead can rarely constitute a fraudulent convey-
ance, but in In re Jones,15 8 the transfer contributed to that result. In that
case, the unmarried owner of a homestead sold it and transferred some of
the proceeds to his fianc6e to buy a truck. Because this transfer occurred
151. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.254(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006). For an instance illustrat-
ing that a homestead may be established when a family moves from another state to Texas,
even though they had not taken up residence in a new Texas home under renovation, see
Kendall Builders, Inc. v. Chesson, 149 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. denied).
The family, in the course of moving to Texas, was successful in establishing their homestead
by preparation, despite actual occupance.
152. MCKee, 174 S.W.3d at 845.
153. 163 S.W.3d 318 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, pet. denied).
154. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.035(b) (Vernon 2002). See Dominguez,
163 S.W.3d at 324.
155. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN § 16.065 (Vernon 1997).
156. Dominguez, 163 S.W.3d at 324, 327.
157. Id. at 331.
158. 327 B.R. 297 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
20061 1329
SMU LAW REVIEW
within one year of his filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, it was "in [the]
nature of [a] fraudulent transfer" under the Bankruptcy Code.159 The
debtor in bankruptcy was also unable to explain the disposition of $57,000
received for the sale of his residence. Though the debtor may hold such
proceeds as exempt property for six months to allow him time to
purchase another homestead, 160 property other than a homestead in
which the proceeds are invested during the six-month period are not ex-
empt from creditors' claims.161 The debtor, who in this instance was una-
ble to produce records to substantiate disposition of the funds, had the
burden of showing that his failure to produce the records was justified
under the circumstances in order to avoid denial of a discharge. 162 The
debtor was unable to satisfy his burden of proof, and his discharge in
bankruptcy was denied. 163
3. Home-Equity Loans
The Texas Constitutional requirements164 necessary for enforcement of
home-equity loans are sometimes overlooked. One of these require-
ments is that the lender may not "require" that the borrower apply loan
proceeds to pay an existing debt to the same lender. 65 In In re Box,166
the loan agreement contained a recital that the lender had not required
the borrower to pay a debt owed to the lender. The bankruptcy court,
however, found that both the homeowners and the lender knew that the
recital was false when the agreement was made,167 though the lender ar-
gued that repayment of a prior loan had not been required as demon-
strated by the fact that the borrower had voluntarily entered into the loan
agreement.168 The court concluded that "require" in the statute means
that the lender demanded the term in the loan agreement as a sine qua
non for making the loan, as was apparent in this instance.' 69 Thus, "the
mendacious recitals and affirmations" could not validate the constitution-
ally prohibited loan as shown by the facts.' 70 The bankruptcy court sug-
gested an analogy between this situation and the attitude of Texas courts
toward borrowers' assertions that the property used as collateral for a
loan is not their true homestead (though demonstrably untrue) and that
another property where they do not make their home is their
159. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2005).
160. Jones, 327 B.R. at 301 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(c) (Vernon 2005)).
161. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(a) (Vernon 2005).
162. Jones, 327 B.R. at 304 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3) (2005)); In re Juzwiak, 89 F.3d
424, 428 (7th Cir. 1996).
163. Jones, 327 B.R. at 305-07.
164. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a).
165. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(i).
166. 324 B.R. 290 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005), affd, Box v. First State Bank, 340 B.R. 782
(S.D. Tex. 2006).
167. Id. at 292.
168. Id. at 293.





In another dispute, 172 the same bankruptcy court denied fees and costs
to a lender who sought, unsuccessfully, to remove the automatic stay in
its attempt to foreclose a home-equity loan contrary to the Bankruptcy
Act. 173 The fees for foreclosure on an over-secured home-equity loan
were deemed "unreasonable" in the sense that the lender's acts were not
commercially prudent. 174
4. Personal-Property Exemptions
If a debtor claims exemptions in bankruptcy and no objection is made
to his claim, that property vests in the debtor 175 and the exempt property
is thereafter immune from liability for pre-petition debts. 176 If the Chap-
ter 7 case is then converted into a Chapter 13 case, the deadline for ob-
jecting to exemptions does not at that point recommence; the same result
occurs when a case is converted from a Chapter 13 proceeding to one
under Chapter 7.177 The issue before the court in Antonov v. Walters'78
was whether the wife's claims' for personal injury and lost wage claims'
constituted exempt personalty in her Chapter 7 bankruptcy filed soon af-
ter she was injured. No objection was filed to her exemption claim,179
and the jury awarded a large verdict in her favor. At that point, the trus-
tee in bankruptcy intervened in the proceeding, and the court entered
judgment in favor of both the wife and the bankruptcy trustee. On the
defendant-tortfeasor's appeal, he asserted that the wife lacked standing
to sue. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals concluded that, although all
property of a bankrupt becomes the property of the bankruptcy estate
when the petition is filed, the wife's assertion of her exemptions (to which
no objection was made) had vested in her free of debt. The wife there-
fore had standing to sue the tortfeasor. 180 Further, the trustee had "an
enforceable interest to protect," and his claim dated back to the wife's
filing, thus disposing of the appellant's assertion of the running of the
171. Id. at 294-95 (citing In re Niland, 809 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 1987); Tex. Land &
Loan Co. v. Blalock, 76 Tex. 85, 87, 13 S.W. 12, 13 (1890)).
172. In re Valdez, 324 B.R. 296 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
173. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2005); Valdez, 324 B.R. at 300 (citing U.S.C. § 506(b)(3)).
174. Valdez, 324 B.R. at 301-02.
175. 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (2005); FED. R. BANK. PROC. 4003.
176. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (2005).
177. See In re Fonke, 321 B.R. 199, 205-09 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005). For a review of
some of the consequences of the 2005 enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act in relation to real estate holdings of Chapters 7 and 13 home-
stead claimants, see Patrick E. Mears & John T. Gregg, What Congress Hath Wrought, 19
PROB. & PROP. 23, 26 (Nov.-Dec. 2005). In that article, the authors also discuss the timely
filing of objections to exemptions when delays are occasioned by a lack of time to complete
the creditors' meeting or in finding a convenient time for its rescheduling.
178. 168 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied). For a case involving a
pre-petition personal-injury claim recorded after the petition in Chapter 13 was filed, see
In re Launza, 337 B.R. 286 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005).
179. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(D)-(E) (2005).
180. Antonov, 168 S.W.3d at 906.
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statute of limitation against him.181
In Goebel v. Brandley,182 the issue was whether a voluntary payroll
deduction of wages directed by the debtor-employee to her employer to
buy bonds in favor of her children constituted a fraudulent transfer. The
court held that no fraudulent transfer was made in that situation. In
reaching that conclusion, the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Ap-
peals characterized the divested funds as the employee-debtor's current
and unpaid wages, which are clearly constitutionally exempt property
when still in the hands of the employer. 183 Hence, their transfer by the
debtor was not a fraudulent transferor. The creditor contended that, be-
cause the debtor-employee had control over her wages, they had lost
their exempt status. In repelling this argument, the debtor relied on the
1989 amendment to the turnover statute,184 whereby current wages are
excluded from the scope of that act except in the context of court-ordered
child support. 85 The court was also unmoved by the creditor's further
argument that the debtor's ability to cancel her direction to her employer
constituted a constructive receipt of the wages. The court added that the
purchase of the bonds was not commensurate to the employee's deposit-
ing her paycheck into her bank account, which she did not do, and the
bonds were then issued in the names of her children. 186 It was also
pointed out that the creditor's judgment against the debtor was incurred
years after the payroll-deduction plan had been in operation. 187 This situ-
ation poses a very close question. It was resolved here in favor of the
exemption-claimant, but not really for the claimant's actual benefit.
In In re Watson,188 the trustee in bankruptcy sought a turnover order
against the trustee of a spendthrift trust for the benefit of a Chapter 7
bankrupt. The trust had been created for the debtor's benefit by his
grandfather in 1987, and the beneficiary had a right to demand withdraw-
als from the settlor's later additions to the trust. The bankruptcy-trustee
asserted the beneficiary's right to take down those additions to the trust.
The trustee of the trust asserted that because of the spendthrift quality of
the trust, which protected both income and corpus of the trust from the
beneficiary's creditors, the beneficiary had no beneficial interest in those
amounts that would be includable in his bankruptcy estate. The trustee
further asserted that the right to distribute assets was wholly discretion-
ary. 189 The court disagreed with the trustee, stating that the trustee's
right was not wholly discretionary because the beneficiary had a present
interest to demand distribution of one-third of the additions to the trust
as clearly provided in the trust agreement, and the bankruptcy-trustee
181. Id. at 907.
182. 174 S.W.3d 359 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
183. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28.
184. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(f) (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2006).
185. Goebel, 174 S.W.3d at 365.
186. Id. at 365-66.
187. Id. at 366.
188. In re Watson, 325 B.R. 380 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
189. Id. at 385-86 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.035 (Vernon 2006)).
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could stand in the shoes of the bankrupt beneficiary to demand part of
the trust corpus. 190
The decision of the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals in Ortega v. LLP
Mortgage, Ltd.191 dealt with a couple's purported transfer of their home-
stead. A father and his son formed a partnership in 1978. In 1982, the
partnership sought to negotiate a loan from the Small Business Adminis-
tration but lacked the collateral needed to secure the loan. The father
and mother owned a home, and they transferred it to the partnership in
1982 to be used as the collateral. The fundamental question was whether
the transfer of the home to the partnership was a sham transaction made
under pressure or suggestion of the lender. If a sham, the transfer was
not valid, the home did not lose its homestead character, and it was thus
still the homestead of the father and mother when given by the partner-
ship as collateral for the loan in 1984. In 1997, the partnership defaulted
on the loan, and the lender's assignee of the note sued to foreclose the
mortgage. The father and mother counterclaimed, asserting that the
notes subjecting the home to liability were invalid. Summary judgment,
however, was rendered in favor of the holder of the notes.1 92
Claiming their homestead interest in the home, the parents were suc-
cessful in their appeal. The court of appeals narrowed the appeal to a
single issue: the trial court's error in submission of the question of sham-
transfer to the jury.193 The parents asserted that the court's charge to the
jury was erroneous in that two questions were posed in the wrong order.
The jury was charged to answer first whether the parents' home consti-
tuted a homestead in 1984 when the transfer was made by the partner-
ship, and second, if so, whether the parents' 1982 transfer of the home to
the partnership involved "any condition of defeasance. ' 194 The appellate
court concluded that the order of this jury charge was erroneous-the
jury could not answer the first question properly without first dealing
with the second question. Whether the parents had a homestead interest
in 1984 "depended, in part, on whether the 1982 transfer [was] valid ......
In other words, if the 1982 transfer was valid, the parents would not have
had a homestead interest in the property in 1984.195 Despite the court's
analysis, the only question that the trial court really needed to ask was
whether the 1982 transfer of the homestead was valid for the purpose of
serving as collateral for the loan. If so, the trial court would have prop-
erly ruled in favor of the note holder. If not, the court would have ruled
in favor of the parents.
In Rousey v. Jacoway,196 the Supreme Court of the United States held
190. Id. at 387.
191. 160 S.W.3d 596 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. denied).
192. Id. at 601.
193. As to another point that might have controlled the outcome of the case, the appel-
late court concluded that exclusion of certain evidence was not erroneous.
194. Ortega, 160 S.W.3d at 601.
195. Id. at 601-02.
196. 544 U.S. 320 (2005).
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that, under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code 197 and the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 198 a couple's individual retirement accounts were exempt
from their creditors' claims, though readily accessible to them but with
some adverse federal-tax consequences:199 (1) the right to receive pay-
ments must be from "a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, or
similar plan or contract;" (2) the right to receive payments must be "on
account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service;" and (3)
even then, the right to receive payment may be exempted only to the
extent that it is "reasonably necessary to support the account holder or
his dependents." 20 0
IV. DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY ON DIVORCE
A. DIVORCE PROCESS
1. Jurisdiction and Venue
In Shackelford v. Barton,20 1 the court explained that the failure of the
respondent (a prisoner) to make a timely objection to a jurisdictional re-
cital in a final divorce decree protected such a judgment from collateral
attack even if other parts of the record showed a lack of jurisdiction. The
court then explained the limits of a trial court's jurisdiction over a di-
vorce: a trial court retains jurisdiction over a case for thirty days after
signing a final judgment. Its plenary power may be extended for up to an
additional seventy-five days by filing an appropriate post-judgment mo-
tion within that initial thirty-day period. If a party files an appropriate
post-judgment order, however, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the
case at the end of the initial thirty days and has no power to set aside a
judgment thereafter except by bill of review for sufficient cause. After
the court's plenary jurisdiction ends, the trial court retains its inherent
power to clarify or enforce its divorce decree. Thereafter, any order to
amend, modify, or alter the final decree is beyond the court's power.20 2
2. Temporary Protective Orders
There are several exceptions to the general rule that appellate jurisdic-
tion does not extend to cases in which a final judgment has not been
rendered. 203 In some instances, interlocutory orders are appealable, 204
but in disputes between husbands and wives, these situations do not ordi-
narily arise. A temporary protective order in response to family-violence
is often included with other protective orders and may sometimes be is-
197. 26 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2005).
198. 11 U.S.C. § 322(d)(10)(E) (2005).
199. Rousey, 544 U.S. at 326-28.
200. Id. at 325-26.
201. 156 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2004, pet. denied).
202. Id. at 606-07.
203. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); Jack B. Anglin
Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992).




sued under a cause number other than that of the pending divorce. 205
Unless there is a final order, however, such blanket orders are not ap-
pealable, and appealing a temporary order with respect to family violence
may only lead to a pyrrhic victory.
In its exercise of temporary emergency jurisdiction, the trial court in In
re M.G.M20 6 entered an ex parte interlocutory protective order in favor
of the wife against her husband to ensure the safety of their children. In
its protective order, the court also prohibited the husband from "transfer-
ring, encumbering, or otherwise disposing of property mutually owned or
leased by the parties." The Beaumont appellate court held that making
that additional order with respect to property was beyond the scope of
the court's temporary emergency jurisdiction in the absence of any evi-
dence that this further order "related to emergency protection [of a]
child, parent or sibling. '207
When a divorce was proceeding between the spouses in Crane v.
Crane,20 8 the court granted a protective order in response to allegations
of continuous family violence perpetrated by the husband, despite a great
deal of conflicting testimony as to the behavior of the husband and wife.
At the final hearing on this matter in February 2006, the court held that
the court's conclusions were supported by sufficient evidence.
3. Notice
In Mathis v. Lockwood,20 9 the Supreme Court of Texas addressed the
issue of sufficiency of notice in a dispute turning on the validity of an
informal marriage but not peculiarly applicable to that subject matter. In
this case, an alleged husband filed a suit for declaratory judgment that
there was no informal marriage between him and the respondent. The
woman allegedly filed an answer, but it was not in the record. The case
was set for trial, and in the woman's absence, judgment was rendered for
the man. Nearly a month later, the woman filed a motion for a rehearing,
stating that she did not receive notice of the trial. The court set a hearing
and evidently held it, but the motion was apparently not ruled on until a
second hearing was held a month later when the judge ruled against the
woman. The Dallas appeals court sustained the trial judge's ruling.210
In its per curiam response, the Texas Supreme Court considered only
one question as necessary for determination: whether the woman had es-
tablished that her nonappearance was not intentional or the result of con-
scious indifference.21' The court concluded that there was no
205. See Hamel v. Hamel, 161 S.W.3d 736, 738 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2005, no pet.).
206. In re M.G.M., 163 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2005, no pet.).
207. Id. at 198.
208. 188 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. filed).
209. 166 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. 2005).
210. Id. at 745.
211. Id. at 744. The court stated that it did not need to consider whether a new trial
would be necessary because the woman's sworn motion asserted that a new trial would not
injure the man, and there was nothing in the record to prove the contrary. Id.
2006] 1335
SMU LAW REVIEW
presumption that she had been given notice.212
Here, the record contain[ed] no certificate of service, no return re-
ceipt from certified or registered mail, and no affidavit certifying ser-
vice.... As none of the prerequisites for prima facie proof of service
were met, the court of appeals was incorrect in indulging a presump-
tion that [the woman] received the notice [that the man's] counsel
[had] sent.213
The only oral evidence of service in the record was that of the man's
attorney. That was not enough evidence to raise a presumption that the
petitioner had received notice. 214 Even if the trial judge disbelieved the
woman's testimony, there was still no affirmative evidence that notice
had been given.215 Though notice was sent to the woman's former attor-
ney, he had then already withdrawn from representation. The woman's
last known address to which notice was sent was the man's: the man could
not give notice to the woman "by serving himself. '216 His counsel's rep-
resentation that his office called the woman about the hearing did not
show personal knowledge that the notice was received, "certainly not 45
days before trial."' 217 Even assuming that there is a duty on the part of a
party to keep the court informed of her address (a point about which
there is some disagreement among the courts of appeals), "due process
requires some lesser sanction than trial without notice or an opportunity
to be heard. '2 18 Thus, without hearing oral argument, the Texas Supreme
Court granted the woman's petition for review, and the case was re-
manded to the trial court.219
In response to his wife's suit for divorce in In re Runberg,220 the hus-
band appeared at the hearing for temporary orders. At that hearing, he
had announced that he was ready, but he had not made a written assent.
After the hearing, he hired counsel, and his lawyer wrote a letter to the
wife's lawyer. The wife gave the husband no further notice, and after the
court entered a judgment, the husband moved for a new trial, which was
denied without a hearing. The husband appealed to the Amarillo Court
of Appeals. In reviewing the denial of the motion for new trial for abuse
of discretion, the Amarillo court held that the husband's participation at
the temporary hearing was in the nature of an appearance in the suit as a
matter of law, and thus his due-process right of notice of the final hearing
attached. The court concluded, however, that the husband was not re-
quired to fulfill the mandate of Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines Inc. 221
The court noted that all three elements of Craddock "are based in eq-




216. Id. at 746.
217. Id. (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 245).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. 159 S.W.3d 194 (Tex. App.-Amarillo, 2005, no pet.).
221. 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (1939).
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uity," and they are not always applicable. Justice Reavis dissented on the
ground that the wife's pleading had given the husband adequate notice
that a dispute in judgment might be rendered against him if he did not file
another answer within the time limits, as explained in the wife's
pleadings. 222
4. Appointment of Arbitrator
The Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held in Goetz v.
Goetz223 that if the parties to a divorce agree to enter into a mediated
settlement agreement but are unable to decide on an arbitrator to achieve
a mediated settlement agreement, the court can appoint an arbitrator for
that purpose if the parties' agreement does not specify the method of
appointment. 224
5. Mandamus
In In re Rowe,225 the Eastland Court of Appeals dealt with a husband's
petition for a writ of mandamus to order a trial court to abate the wife's
divorce proceeding brought in a county in which she had not been a resi-
dent for ninety days as required by section 6.301.226 Two days later, the
husband filed his petition in the county where the spouses had lived to-
gether. The husband's argument in support of prompt relief was that pas-
sage of time would defeat his venue argument and make any appeal moot
as to venue. Though the Waco appellate court had held in Cook v. May-
field2 27 that a writ of mandamus will not lie in such cases, in this instance,
the Eastland court declined to follow that decision in light of the statu-
tory provision that durational residence for the purpose of venue is fixed
at the date of filing for divorce. In denying the writ of mandamus, the
Eastland court said that the husband's appellate remedy is adequate
when the benefits of mandamus-review are outweighed by its detri-
ments, 228 which include disruption of the trial process by taking up "valu-
able time with issues that may ultimately be unimportant to the
disposition of the case" and thereby add "to the expense and delay [in]
the litigation. '229 The court added that, in the absence of legislative in-
tervention, this issue should now be resolved by the supreme court.230
222. Runberg, 159 S.W.3d at 199-200.
223. 130 S.W.3d 359 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
224. Id. at 361-62.
225. 182 S.W.3d 424 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2005, no pet.).
226. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.301 (Vernon 1998).
227. 886 S.W.2d 840, 842-43 (Tex. App.-Waco 1994, no writ), cf Beavers v. Beavers,
543 S.W.3d 549, 722-23 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco, 1976, no writ).
228. Rowe, 182 S.W.3d at 426.
229. Id.
230. The court commented briefly on the failure of prior legislative response to this sort
of problem. Id. at 426-27.
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6. Disqualification of Counsel
A pair of disputes dealt with problems of disqualification of counsel in
not particularly unusual situations, and both decisions are very brief. In
In re Gerry,231 the shorter one, a husband appealed the trial court's deci-
sion to deny his motion to substitute counsel. The husband had moved to
substitute counsel early in the divorce proceeding. The wife objected, as-
serting that the proposed substitute counsel's firm had a conflict of inter-
est because she had spoken to another attorney in the same firm as that
of the proposed counsel to represent her. All that the attorney could
recall was that the wife had said something about her husband's having
been in jail and that the wife would call back if the wife wished to hire
her. The attorney testified that it was "entirely possible" that in the con-
ference of 42 minutes, the wife might have orally provided her with confi-
dential information, but she did not remember receiving any documents
from her. She also said that she could not "categorically refute" the
wife's assertion that the wife might have given documents to someone
else at her firm, though she had no personal knowledge in that regard.232
During the hearing, the wife's attorney offered to provide any specific
information in camera, but the husband's attorney declined the offer.233
The trial court nevertheless denied the husband's motion to substitute
counsel, and the appellate court denied his motion for mandamus.2 34
In In re Bivins,235 the wife sought to vacate an order granting her hus-
band's motion to disqualify her attorney. The attorney had prepared the
husband's will and had advised him regarding the adoption of his wife's
children from a prior marriage. The husband's motion rested principally
on the fact that the wife's attorney had prepared a deed of conveyance by
the husband's father to the husband, and the character of that property
was in dispute in the case. The husband testified that he had paid the
lawyer's fee, though the attorney represented both the husband and his
father in the transaction.236 In conditionally granting the writ of manda-
mus, the Waco appellate court pointed out that a denial of relief sought
by the husband in such a case might rest on some other solution if, for
example, the court could protect the husband from any harm by barring
the attorney from testifying. 237 The court put great weight on the fact
that the husband had not shown that some lesser alternative was not
available and that he did not show actual prejudice on the part of the
lawyer.
The court's decision in In re Fischer-Stoker238 responded to a petition
for a writ of mandamus to dismiss a contempt proceeding brought in the
231. 173 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2005, no pet.).
232. Id. at 904.
233. Id. at 903 n.1.
234. Id. at 904.
235. 162 S.W.3d 415 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, pet. granted).
236. Id. at 417, 419.
237. Id. at 417-18 (citing In re Nitla S.A. de C.V., 92 S.W.3d 419, 422 (Tex. 2002)).
238. 174 S.W.3d 272 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
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trial court after the court had granted a divorce and division of property.
The court originally ordered each party to make checks to the other from
bank accounts and to supply the other with accountings as to the funds on
deposit. Shortly thereafter, the wife filed her appeal to the judgment in
the principal suit. The husband then filed a motion for contempt until the
wife complied with the past judgment orders of the trial court. The trial
court refused to dismiss the contempt proceedings, and the wife filed a
petition for a writ of mandamus. The Houston First District Court of
Appeals conditionally granted the mandamus. That court observed that
section 9.007(a) provides that the trial court is limited in its powers to
enforce a decree for property division to making an order "to assist in the
implementation of or to clarify" the division of property in the decree, 239
and that this power is specifically abated during the pendency of an ap-
peal.240 Further, the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals had
previously held in English v. English241 that the trial court is precluded
from implementing or clarifying the property division. The court con-
strued the husband's proceedings and the response of the trial court 242 as
coming within the acts precluded.
7. Appeal and Error
The McGoodwins have climbed up and down the judicial ladder several
times.243 As part of a settlement of their 1989 divorce proceeding, the
husband and his closely held corporation executed a promissory note to
the wife for $150,000, with interest payments of $1,500 each month until
October 1997, when payments on the principal and interest were to begin.
The couple also entered into a security agreement by which the wife was
to hold corporate stock as collateral for performance of the note. The
following day, the husband and wife entered into an agreement incident
to divorce by which they divided the community shares in the corpora-
tion. Their divorce decree incorporated the agreement, and its terms
were performed for over two years until the corporation ceased most of
its business activities. In 2001, the ex-wife brought a successful suit to
enforce the note. The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed the ex-wife's
judgment on the note and limited her recovery to the six years before the
2001 suit.244 On remand to the trial court, the ex-wife was granted a
monetary award with post-judgment interest. The ex-husband and the
corporation, however, failed to perform the terms of the judgment, and
the ex-wife brought another suit. The ex-wife prevailed in the trial court,
and the ex-husband appealed. The ex-husband argued that his liabilities
under the note and under the first agreement were merged into the sec-
239. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.007(a)-(b) (Vernon 1998).
240. Id. § 9.007(c) (Vernon 1998).
241. 44 S.W.3d 102, 106 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
242. Fischer-Stoker, 174 S.W.3d at 275.
243. McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 181 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied).




ond agreement (the agreement incident to divorce) and were thus dis-
charged. The Dallas appellate court rejected this argument because the
parties to the two agreements were different, and the subject matter was
different. The court also attached significance to the fact that the security
agreement was entered into before the agreement incident to divorce.
Thus, the parties evidently intended that each transaction was indepen-
dent of the other in concluding the divorce settlement. 245 The court re-
jected the ex-husband's argument that the ex-wife's efforts to enforce the
note was a collateral attack on the divorce decree.246 The terms of the
divorce settlement were therefore resolved in favor of the ex-wife.
B. MAKING THE DIVISION
1. Property Settlement Agreements
In the divorcing couple's mediated property settlement agreement at
issue in Goetz v. Goetz,247 certain community property was awarded to
the wife, and a lien on that property was awarded to the husband. In her
appeal, the wife asserted that the award deprived her of her separate
property contrary to the rule of law that a spouse's separate property
cannot be divided on divorce. 248 The wife argued that the settlement (de-
spite its use of the word division and not partition), which stated that the
husband "is hereby divested of all rights, title, interest, and claim," had
the effect of creating a separate property interest as a consequence of the
settlement. The court held that the mediated settlement stood not as a
partition agreement, but as an agreement incident to divorce and was
thus subject to the court's review to determine proper characterization
and division or repudiation by either party before the court's finding that
the agreement is "just and right" and granting the divorce.249 A written
"agreement incident to divorce" entered into under section 6.604 is dif-
ferent from such partition agreements.250
An agreement to divorce is binding on the parties if it is provided that
the terms are irrevocable and that agreement is put "in boldfaced type or
in capital letters or underlined" and signed by the spouses and their attor-
neys. A mediated property settlement under section 6.602 is subject to
those same rules.25 1 In Lee v. Lee,252 the divorcing couple sought to
reach an agreement ostensibly under section 6.602 (as specifically noted
therein in capital letters) as to the division of property, but the agreement
was reached without the assistance of counsel or a mediator. Before the
rendition of the divorce, the husband announced his repudiation of the
agreement. The court, however, refused to accept the repudiation and
245. McGoodwin, 181 S.W.3d at 874.
246. Id.
247. 130 S.W.3d 359 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
248. See Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977).
249. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.006 (Vernon 1998).
250. Id. § 6.604.
251. Id. § 6.602.
252. 158 S.W.3d 612 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).
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rendered judgment on the agreement. In his appeal, the husband sought
to take the agreement outside the purview of section 6.602. The Fort
Worth appellate court noted that "mediation" might be achieved without
a neutral mediator's assistance and that "for many years," section 7.006
had allowed "divorcing parties to enter into written agreements without
requiring mediation concerning the division of the community [es-
tate]." 253 Thus, the court refused "to carve out a common-law exception"
to section 6.602 "based on mere form. '254 The court went on to say, how-
ever, that the agreement of the parties was not mediated in the sense of
that term in section 6.602 and therefore fell under section 7.006.255 With-
out even considering the fact that compliance with section 6.002(b) had
been recited in the agreement itself in capital letters, the court concluded
that the trial court's ruling was erroneous and that the husband might
repudiate his settlement under section 7.006.256 The enactment of section
6.604 in 2005 provides that an informal settlement conference may pro-
duce a binding written agreement with the usual capitalized notice or
with underscored words or boldface type and warning of binding effect;
this settlement is also subject to rejection by the court if found not to be
just and right.25 7
During the course of the divorce trial in Haynes v. Haynes,258 the
couple entered into an irrevocable written mediated property settlement
allocating the husband's non-transferable stock options by net value in
unequal shares favoring the wife. Despite the husband's objection, in the
divorce decree prepared by the wife's attorney and approved by the
court, additional terms were supplied to make the husband "constructive
trustee" of the wife's interest in the options and to provide other details
including the handling of tax liabilities. The husband objected to the de-
cree's additional "terms [to which] he did not agree" 259 and the "imposed
additional duties, liabilities, and burdens on him."'260 The Dallas appel-
late court held that the trial court had followed the "material term" of
division as provided in the mediated agreement, had merely provided im-
plementation of the agreement, and had not changed it.
Another variant of such an agreement was before the Amarillo appel-
late court in Woods v. Woods.261 In this case, the couple entered into
what the appellate court referred to simply as an "Agreement Incident to
253. Id. at 613.
254. Id. at 613-14.
255. Id. at 614.
256. What was purported to be a mediated settlement in Argovitz v. Argovitz, No. 14-
04-00885-CV, 2005 WL 2739152 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 25, 2005, no pet.),
was sought to be rescinded by the ex-wife for fraud. The court held that the ex-wife's
complaint was estopped by her acceptance-of-benefits of the agreement. For a contrary
result in application of the acceptance of benefits doctrine, cf Raymond v. Raymond, 190
S.W.3d 77, 79-80 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
257. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.604 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
258. 180 S.W.3d 927 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
259. Id. at 930.
260. Id. at 929.
261. 167 S.W.3d 932 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2005, no pet.).
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Divorce," which is subject to revocation by either party under section
7.006.262 The parties's agreement was presented to the court only about
twenty days after filing the petition. Then, the trial judge told the parties
that a temporary order based on their agreement was approved and
would be entered as a final judgment when they submitted their final
decree after the sixty-day waiting period263 had run. It appears that the
wife moved to withdraw her consent sometime before entry of the final
decree. The court nevertheless entered its judgment in accordance with
the agreement. The appellate court held that the trial court had clearly
acted improperly by incorporating the agreement in the final decree.
The issue before the court in Guerrero v. Guerra264 was decidedly more
complex in that (1) it required a more difficult interpretation of the par-
ties' agreed judgment, and (2) it arose not by way of an appeal from the
judgment but in response to the ex-husband's motion almost twenty years
later to clarify the judgment with respect to their agreement concerning
his former wife's retirement benefits as amplified since divorce through
post-divorce earnings. The trial court found that the term of the agreed
judgment, which was res judicata and had the finality of the decree, was
nevertheless ambiguous.
The judgment in Guerrero provided that the husband was entitled to a
share of the wife's retirement benefits "accrued or unaccrued, matured or
unmatured, vested or otherwise ... with all increases thereon ... if, as,
and when paid. ' 265 The agreed decree further provided that the amount
of the retirement pay received was to be adjusted "in accordance with the
approved 'after-acquired' property theory concerning division of pension
and retirement benefits. '266 Though the San Antonio appellate court
concluded that the opening language suggested that the retirement bene-
fits would be valued at the date of the ex-wife's retirement, the court
noted that the latter term of the agreed judgment suggested that the ben-
efits were to be valued at the date of divorce by reference to the rule that
post-divorce compensation of a former spouse is that person's separate
property. The appellate court applied the doctrine of interpreting the
ambiguous decree as a contract when entered into.267 Since the trial
court had heard all the evidence with respect to the making of the con-
tract and the testimony of the parties concerning its making, the appellate
court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the ambiguous terms
would be interpreted as having the former meaning,268 especially in light
of the fact that both parties testified that they did not know the meaning
of the phrase "after-acquired property theory. '269
262. Id.
263. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.702 (Vernon 1998).
264. 165 S.W.3d 778 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, no pet.).
265. Id. at 781.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 782-84.
268. Id. at 784.
269. Id. In using that phrase, it may be surmised that the parties' council who drafted
the judgment were pupils of a fact generation of law-professors who responded to a stu-
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In State Farm Insurance Co. v. Martinez,270 the Waco Court of Appeals
dealt with the consequences of an insured husband's attempt to change
the beneficiary of his life insurance policy during his second marriage. In
reaching a settlement of their interests, the husband and his first wife had
agreed that she would be the beneficiary of his life insurance contract in
order to assure receipt of the monetary settlement to which they had
agreed. Shortly before his death, however, the husband directed the in-
surer to substitute his second wife as the beneficiary of the policy. Aware
of the terms of the settlement with the first wife, the insurer refused to
make the requested change. Following his death, the second wife brought
suit to determine the proper beneficiary of the policy and claimed the
statutory penalty for the insurer's delay in payment. The first wife also
sued as the proper beneficiary. 2 71 The insurer in turn filed an inter-
pleader suit against the claimants, and the two suits were consolidated for
trial. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the second
wife, subject to a constructive trust in favor of the first wife for the unpaid
portion of the divorce settlement, and awarded the second wife her statu-
tory claim against the insurer and her attorney's fees.
The insurance company appealed. Its claim was rejected by the Waco
appellate court on the ground that the insurer's position was not in accor-
dance with the policy's terms. In terms of the community property man-
agement, the court commented that
even if the insured's first wife had a community interest in the policy
proceeds when payable, the insurer had neither the contractual right
nor legal standing to prevent the insured from changing the benefici-
ary to his second wife.272
Chief Justice Gray dissented with respect to the insurer's liability for a
statutory penalty, attorney's fees, and pre-judgment interest on the
ground that the insurer did not delay unreasonably in paying the widow
in light of its doubts as to the proper distribution under the policy.273
2. Making the Division
Judicial division of property on divorce must be supported by evidence.
In In re Padilla,274 neither the wife nor her attorney appeared at the hear-
dent's reply to a question "on what theory?" "Theory" in that context might have meant
"for what reason?" or "for what person, or precedent, or some other rule of bar?"
270. 174 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, pet. granted).
271. The daughter of the first marriage, who was named as successor beneficiary of the
policy, also sued for a share of the proceeds. The trial court dismissed the daughter's claim
as not supported by the terms of the policy. In his change of beneficiary designation, the
insured had not named her as successor beneficiary.
272. State Farm Ins. Co., 174 S.W.3d at 779. The decedent's daughter of this first mar-
riage also appealed. The appellate court concluded that the insurer acted within the terms
of the policy in recognizing the daughter as a successor beneficiary, relying inter alia on
Salvato v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 424 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968,
no writ).
273. State Farm Ins. Co., 174 S.W.3d at 791.
274. No. 10-05-00184-CV, 2005 WL 2465794 (Tex. App.-Waco Oct. 5, 2005, no pet.).
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ing; the trial court considered the husband's petition, granted the divorce,
and divided the property without hearing any evidence with respect to
the value of the personal or real property, debts (except for a $20,000
loan for which the husband agreed to be responsible), or retirement ben-
efits except by way of the husband's testimony. On the wife's appeal, the
Waco court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for trial. The
court adopted the wife's argument that the trial court simply had no
means of dividing the property in a manner that was just and right 275
without having substantially more evidence.
In In re Powel 276 the court ordered the ex-husband to pay $1,000 to his
ex-wife's attorney by a certain date. Two days before the deadline, the
ex-husband paid agents to deliver the $1,000 in twenty bank bags of
100,000 unrolled pennies to the attorney's office. After he had made en-
quiries of several banks to redeem the coins, the attorney found a bank
that consented and charged the attorney $100 for its service, leaving the
attorney with a net fee of $900. The attorney promptly filed a second
motion to enforce the court's order. At the hearing, the ex-husband ex-
pressed his contempt for the attorney and the inconvenience and de-
fended himself by asserting that he had done what the court had ordered
him to do. The court found the ex-husband's conduct "frivolous and ri-
diculous" and ordered him to pay the attorney $100 for the bank's fee,
$350 in attorney's fees, and court costs of $83 but did not hold him in
contempt. The court described the mode of payment very precisely. On
the ex-husband's appeal, he asserted that the court had no reason for
making its order. In affirming the trial court order, the Eastland appel-
late court held that the trial court had acted well within its inherent
power to aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction and that it had "vast discre-
tion to maintain control of the proceedings before it. '"277
3. Clarification and Enforcement
In In re A.E.R.,2 78 the ex-wife sought clarification of a 1992 agreed di-
vorce decree and a qualified domestic relations order ("QDRO") that
went beyond the terms of the decree with respect to the ex-wife's enjoy-
ment of the ex-husband's military retirement benefits and in some in-
stances, beyond the benefits to which she would be entitled under federal
law. The decree did not indicate any agreement of the ex-wife's entitle-
ment to the benefits that she claimed. The court directed that the trial
court correct its QDRO to conform to that of the divorce decree and
original QDRO.279
275. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001 (Vernon 2002).
276. 170 S.W.3d 156 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2005, no pet.).
277. Id. at 158.
278. No. 2-05-057-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 1342 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Feb. 16,
2006, no pet.). For a recent general summary of the subject see Susan L.B. Darnell, Divid-
ing Military Retirement Benefits, 26 FAM. ADvoc. 31 (No. 2, Fall 2005).
279. In re A.E.R., 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS, at *10-11.
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Correcting the error in In re Jones280 was a much more protracted mat-
ter. Twenty-four years after their divorce, the former spouses disputed
the division of the ex-husband's benefits from the Teachers Retirement
System as requested by the ex-wife. The court entered a QDRO, which
became final thirty days later. Seven weeks later, the court issued an-
other QDRO; three-and-a-half months later, the court issued a third
QDRO in very different terms. A fourth QDRO was entered another ten
months later, after the ex-husband had retired; this QDRO produced the
ex-wife's appeal. The Texarkana court concluded that the fourth QDRO
clarified the first. Though the typewritten decree used 12 1h as the numer-
ator of the prescribed formula, that number had been changed to 7 by
hand; however, there was no evidence to show that the change was made
by anyone other than the trial judge. The fourth QDRO merely supplied
the proper denominator for the formula and thus clarified the first
QDRO. 281
4. Post Divorce Disputes
The decision in de la Garza v. de la Garza282 involved a post-divorce
dispute with respect to contractual alimony payments made six months
late. Neither the pre-judgment-interest statutes in effect at the time of
the judgment 283 nor other rules of law supported the complaint of the ex-
wife's claim. The ex-wife also was not allowed to recover pre-judgment
interest on loans of money allegedly required for the purpose of meeting
her expenses resulting from the ex-husband's failure to make prompt
payment.284 The ex-wife was equally unsuccessful in recovering attor-
ney's fees285 because she did not recover damages in a suit for which at-
torney's fees are specifically recoverable 286 or may be recovered if the
petitioner prevails in the suit.2 8 7
The divorce decree at issue in Morales v. Morales288 provided that the
ex-wife pay her husband $10,000 when their son reached 18, she remar-
ried or had a male non-family-member residing with her, or she decided
to sell their former residence. In 1996, the son informed the ex-husband
that his ex-wife was cohabitating with another man, but the ex-husband
did not sue for recovery of the $10,000 until spring of 2005. Thus, the ex-
husband had failed to file his motion to enforce the decree within two
280. 154 S.W.3d 225 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.).
281. In 2005, section 3.007 was added to the Family Code to provide significant defini-
tions of a considerable variety of employee benefits including defined benefit plans, de-
fined contribution plans, and stock-option plans of various sorts.
282. 185 S.W.3d 924 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
283. Id. at 928 (citing TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 301.002, 302.002, 304.101, & 304.103
(Vernon Supp. 2005)).
284. Id. at 929.
285. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 1997).
286. Id.
287. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.014 (Vernon 1998).




years from the date when his right to payment matured.289 His motion
was therefore barred.
5. Ex-Spousal Maintenance
In two divorce proceedings, the ex-husband appealed an award of ex-
spousal maintenance. In In re McFarland290 the appellate court consid-
ered both the property division and the order for spousal maintenance.
The divorce court had ordered the husband to pay his wife $1,200 a
month for two years and $800 a month for the third year. Her license as a
manicurist had lapsed some time past, and her earning capacity was lim-
ited to work paying less than $10 an hour while the husband's annual
earning capacity neared $80,000. In the division of the marital estate, the
court awarded the home with $35,000 equity to the wife, but after selling
it and paying commissions and taxes, she would get only about half that
amount. The award to her of half the husband's retirement account of
$245,000 would also have left her with less than $100,000 after paying
taxes for premature withdrawal. 291 She would also need to acquire lodg-
ing for herself and the three minor children. With continued assistance
from her extended family, projected wages, and agreed child-support pay-
ments from her husband, it was estimated that she would still be short by
over $1,500 in meeting her monthly bills. These facts justified the order
of spousal maintenance as fixed by the divorce court and the property
division of the divorce court, which the appellate court affirmed.292
Cooper v. Cooper293 involved a couple who had been married for
twenty-one years and had one child under eighteen, for whom the court
had awarded the mother child support of $1,200 a month. The require-
ments of section 8.051(2) were clearly met: (1) the recipient had sought
suitable employment2 94 and (2) she was developing skills necessary to-
ward becoming self-sufficient. On appeal, the husband argued that her
"minimum reasonable needs" were actually met by her income described
in her financial statement without having to resort to other assets. In
addition to her monthly expenses listed in her statement, she was only
making a payment of $208 a month toward discharging a second lien on
289. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.003(b) (Vernon 2002).
290. 176 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.).
291. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.008 (Vernon Supp. 2005), enacted in 2005, provided
specifically that a divorce court may consider the tax consequences of the property division
of various types of assets.
292. In re McFarland, 176 S.W.3d at 660. In reaching its conclusions with respect to the
maintenance order, the court discussed a number of prior cases: O'Carolan v. Hopper, 71
S.W.3d 529 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.); Deltuva v. Deltuva, 113 S.W.3d 882 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.); Lopez v. Lopez, 55 S.W.3d 194 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi
2001, no pet.); Amos v. Amos, 79 S.W.3d 747 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.);
Truehart v. Truehart, No. 14-02-01256-CV, 2003 WL 22176626 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] Sept. 23, 2003, no pet.); and Alaghehband v. Abolbaghaei, No. 03-02-00445-CV, 2003
WL 1986777 (Tex. App.-Austin May 1, 2003, no pet.). In re McFarland, 176 S.W.3d at
658-60.
293. 176 S.W.3d 62 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
294. Id. at 64 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.051(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004)).
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her house and $20 toward payment of her attorney's fees of over $5,000.
The court observed, however, that even without considering whether
child-support payments should be included with the wife's monthly in-
come, the evidence showed that her income fell short of her monthly
needs, and it was uncontested that her earning ability was insufficient to
provide her needs. The trial court had therefore not erred in awarding
spousal maintenance. 295
In Crane v. Crane,296 the divorce court in 1999 ordered ex-spousal
maintenance for the wife to extend through 2002, and in 2003 she filed a
motion for periodic review and continuance 97 of spousal maintenance
because of her unrelieved physical disability and inability to work. Such
orders under section 8.054298 are ordinarily effective for three years or
longer in cases of disability:299 "The court may order maintenance for an
indefinite period as long as the disability continues ... [and] may order
periodic review of its order. ''3°° The trial court in Crane found that the
ex-wife's disability was continuing but unchanged; therefore, her motion
for periodic review was denied. On the ex-wife's appeal, the Fort Worth
court held that, under the 2001 and 2005 statutory amendments, periodic
reviews may be granted to determine continued disability. 30 1 Unlike the
motion to modify, the appellate court observed, proof of a material and
substantial change is not required for modification of the original order
concerning disability, and proof by preponderance of the evidence suf-
fices to support the movant's request. 30 2 Because the divorce court had
ordered maintenance for three and a half years, the appellate court inter-
preted the order as impliedly based on a finding of physical or mental
disability under section 8.054(b) rather than section 8.054(a), which limits
spousal maintenance to three years.303 The court therefore allowed the
ex-wife's appeal.
In Dunn v. Dunn,304 a continuation of spousal maintenance was
sought. The couple had been married to each other, divorced, and then
married again for twelve years. Their three children were adults. The
community property acquired during their second marriage had been di-
vided by agreement. There was some conflict in the evidence as to the
wife's physical disability, but the court nonetheless awarded $890 a month
for ex-spousal maintenance. Over a period of eight months, the trial
court reconsidered maintenance needs on three occasions. Finally, the
295. Id. at 65-66.
296. 188 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. filed).
297. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.054 (Vernon Supp. 2005) is not to be confused with a
motion under § 8.057 to modify maintenance ordered by the original decree. Crane, 188
S.W.3d at 280-81.
298. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.054 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
299. Crane, 188 S.W.3d at 280.
300. Id. at 279 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.054(a) (Vernon Supp. 2005)).
301. Id. at 280-81.
302. Id. at 281.
303. Id.
304. 177 S.W.3d 393 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
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court determined that after three months, only one more payment as
originally ordered would be made, as the former wife reported no change
in circumstances since the divorce as to her physical and financial condi-
tion. The court explained that in making its order, the court was aware of
the fact that the ex-wife had not been forthcoming with any financial
statement or inventory for the court. The ex-wife also had the burden of
proof to show continuing need, and that burden had not been dis-
charged.30 5 The ex-wife also did not object to the court's findings and
conclusions as reviews had been conducted. The ex-wife had therefore
waived any error and presented nothing for review.
305. Id. at 397.
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